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Abstract 
 
Using a sample of 388 securities fraud lawsuits filed between 2002 and 2017 against foreign 
issuers, we examine the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank. We find that the description of Morrison as a “steamroller” substantially ending litigation 
against foreign issuers is a myth. Instead, we find that Morrison did not substantially change the 
type of litigation brought against foreign issuers, which both before and after Morrison focused on 
foreign issuers with a U.S. listing and substantial U.S. trading volume. While dismissal rates rose 
post-Morrison we find no evidence that this is related to the decision. Settlement amounts and 
attorneys’ fees actually rose post-Morrison. We use these findings to theorize that Morrison was 
primarily a preemptive decision about standing that firmly delineated the exposure of foreign 
issuers to U.S. liability in response to the Vivendi case, which sought to expand the scope of 
liability for foreign issuers to include those that traded primarily on non-U.S. venues.  When 
Morrison is placed in its true context it is justified as a decision in-line with prior administrative 
and court actions which have historically aligned firms’ U.S. liability to be proportional with their 
U.S. presence. While Morrison had this defining effect it did not change the litigation environment 
for foreign issuers, the oft-cited import of the decision. More generally, our analysis of Morrison 
also underscores how the decision has been mistakenly interpreted as a case primarily about 
extraterritoriality rather than about standing.  
 
Introduction 
 
 Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.1 has been described as a “steamroller”, 
substantially paring back the ability of private litigants to sue foreign companies for securities 
fraud.2  In Morrison, the Supreme Court held that Section 10(b), the general antifraud provision 
                                               
* Professor, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law 
** Visiting Research Fellow, Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance  
*** Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School 
*** Professor, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. 
The authors wish to thank Vanessa Qian, Samantha Vega and Sam Weinstein for research assistance and Katarina 
Linos, Frank Partnoy, and participants at the Berkeley Corporate Law Conference for their helpful comments and 
suggestions.  
1 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
2 See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Securities Law Ruling Creates Unintended Problems, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, June 
1, 2012, available at https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/securities-law-ruling-created-more-problems-than-it-
solved/. See also Joseph Grundfest, Morrison, the Restricted Scope of Securities Act Section 11 Liability, and 
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of the Securities Act of 1934, does not apply extraterritorially in a private cause of action 
brought under Rule 10b-5. Rather, the Court stated that “Section 10(b) reaches the use of a 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in 
the United States.”3 
 
The Morrison decision circumscribed the scope of liability under Rule 10b-5. Under prior 
case law, a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 in connection with securities purchased 
abroad was possible provided the plaintiff satisfied the “conduct” or “effects” test.4  Morrison 
rejected this standard and eliminated the ability for investors who purchased securities outside 
the United States to bring a private claim under Rule 10b-5.5  More importantly, even for U.S. 
investors, Morrison eliminated their ability to be a part of a global class action suit brought under 
Rule 10b-5 against non-U.S. firms to the extent these investors acquired their securities abroad.   
 
Commentators argued that Morrison was necessary to reduce the exposure of foreign 
issuers to costly and burdensome private securities litigation in the United States.6  Some argued 
that this exposure was causing foreign issuers to delist their securities in the U.S.7  As one 
commentator explained, “non-U.S. issuers were leaving U.S. capital markets, in large part 
because of fear of private securities litigation in the United States.”8   
 
In the wake of Morrison, defense attorneys’ and companies crowed, as investors holding 
billions of dollars of securities were dismissed from Rule 10b-5 class action suits pending against 
non-U.S. issuers.9  Morrison is widely understood as reducing the litigation risk for foreign 
issuers, and the decision has been characterized as potentially “encourage[ing] non-U.S. issuers 
to continue to list their shares on U.S. exchanges and strengthen U.S. capital markets.”10  The 
Morrison decision has been credited with transforming “the way the federal courts look at 
                                               
Prospects for Regulatory Reform, 41 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 20 (2015) (“In [Morrison] the Supreme Court 
revolutionized the application of U.S. securities laws to international transactions.”). 
3 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273. 
4 We discuss the previous “conduct” and “effects” test infra at notes 33-37 and accompanying text.  
5 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273. 
6 The percentage of securities fraud suits against foreign-headquartered companies grew in the years prior to 
Morrison.  See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1177 
n. 2 (2012) (“Federal securities class actions against foreign issuers represented 17% of all actions filed in both 2007 
and 2008”).   
7 See, e.g., Robert J. Giuffra, The Territorial Reach of U.S. Securities Laws After Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, Oct. 13, 2011, 
available at  https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/10/13/the-territorial-reach-of-u-s-securities-laws-after-morrison-
v-national-australia-bank/ (citing substantial number of issuers delisting from the U.S. markets between 2007 and 
2009); Joshua L. Boehm, Private Securities Fraud Litigation after Morrison v. National Australia Bank: 
Reconsidering a Reliance-based Approach to Extraterritoriality, 53 Harv. Int. L.J. 502, 536 (2012) (reporting “a 
2007 survey conducted by the Financial Services Forum found that senior executives from nine of ten foreign 
companies who delisted from the United States between 2003 and 2007 said that litigation risk was a factor in their 
delisting”). 
8 Id.  
9 Michael D. Goldhaber, The Short Arm of the (U.S.) Law, CORP. COUNS., Mar. 2012, at 28. 
10 Giuffra, supra note 7.  Our view, as developed below, is that Morrison did not substantially change the landscape 
for liability of foreign firms listing their securities in the United States but rather defined the scope of liability with 
more circumspection, allowing for a more precise listing decision. 
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transnational securities litigation”11 and with adopting a more restrained approach to the exercise 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
 
 But is this true?  
 
In this paper, we examine the effect of Morrison eight years after its publication, taking 
stock of both its practical implications for issuers and investors and what it tells us about the 
proper role of U.S. federal courts in exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction.  We analyze pre- and 
post-Morrison litigation empirically and find that dramatic claims about Morrison’s impact are 
largely a myth.  Morrison did not substantially change the exposure of foreign issuers to federal 
securities fraud litigation or change the types of issuers who faced U.S. litigation. Nor were 
settlement amounts significantly different after Morrison in 10b-5 cases brought against foreign 
issuers.  Even where the decision had its greatest impact -- the composition of the plaintiff class 
– we find that U.S. exchange trading in defendant firms before Morrison was sufficiently robust 
that pre-Morrison cases could have pled an investor class that would have satisfied its 
transactional test.  While Morrison may have put an end to the “global class action,” prior to 
Morrison, such cases were a rarity. 
 
In Part I, we briefly describe the institutional context in which Morrison arose – the 
increasing globalization of the capital markets and its implications for securities fraud class 
actions.  We then discuss the Morrison decision and the divergent commentary describing its 
impact. Some commentators have defended Morrison as halting a new wave of securities fraud 
litigation against foreign issuers that seemingly imposed U.S. federal law on foreign capital 
markets. Other have faulted Morrison for reducing the scope of securities law protections for 
U.S. investors. 
 
 In Part II, we seek to evaluate the effect of Morrison empirically on federal securities 
fraud litigation involving foreign issuers.  We examine a sample of 388 lawsuits alleging a 
violation of Rule 10b-5 that were filed between 2002 and 2017 against foreign issuers – issuers 
that are headquartered outside the United States.12 We observe that many suits filed in the U.S. 
involve foreign issuers whose securities trade exclusively on U.S. stock exchanges.13  As we 
explain below, previous commentators have not focused on these cases. Importantly, however, 
because of the jurisdictional rule adopted by the Court, the Morrison decision should not affect 
them.  For this reason, our core analyses examine the sample of cases brought against foreign 
firms whose securities traded on at least one non-U.S. exchange. We refer to those firms in this 
                                               
11 George T. Conway, Morrison at Four: A Survey of Its Impact on Securities Litigation, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE 
FOR LEGAL REFORM, at 15 (2014).  
12 We note that our definition of foreign issuer differs from “foreign private issuer” which is a defined term under 
the federal securities laws - Rule 405 of Regulation C under the Securities Act and Rule 3b-4 under the Exchange 
Act.  Foreign private issuer status is determined by the relative degree to which a company’s voting securities are 
held by U.S. investors and the extent of its U.S. business contacts.  The SEC has adopted a variety of rules designed 
to reduce the U.S. regulatory burden on foreign private issuers.  See, e.g., SEC, Accessing the U.S. Capital Markets -
- A Brief Overview of Foreign Private Issuers, dated Feb. 13, 2013, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreign-private-issuers-overview.shtml.  Notably, the SEC has been 
careful to ensure that none of these rules limit the scope of liability for foreign issuers under Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.  See Brett Carron & Steven Davidoff, Getting U.S. Security Holders to the Party:  The SEC’s Cross-Border 
Release Five Years On, 12 U. PENN J. INT'L ECON. L. 455, 480 (2005). 
13 Notably, these issuers are unlikely to qualify under the SEC’s definition as foreign private issuers, as well. 
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paper as “Foreign Listed Firms.” We focus our attention on them on the theory that this is where 
Morrison’s transactional test is likely to have the most impact.14   
 
We explore several questions.  Did Morrison reduce the likelihood that a Foreign Listed 
Firm would face a securities fraud class action in the United States?  Did Morrison change the 
type of Foreign Listed Firm that was sued in U.S. courts? Did Morrison reduce the size or scope 
of litigation against Foreign Listed Firms through smaller settlements and lower fee awards for 
class counsel – reductions that would reduce the incentives for plaintiffs to bring future cases? 
By determining the extent of these effects, if any, we evaluate Morrison’s impact.  
 
We note at the outset that, as with any study examining the effect of Morrison on 
securities litigation, we face an important obstacle in that we lack a counter-factual reality in 
which Morrison never occurred.15 As such, we lack a means to determine whether the cases 
against Foreign Listed Firms that we observe after Morrison would have looked any different 
absent the decision.  To overcome this challenge, we exploit the bright-line character of 
Morrison’s ruling and initially focus on the pre-Morrison period to identify the consequences of 
Morrison’s transactional test on those 10b-5 cases that were brought against Foreign Listed 
Firms. In particular, because it was arguably easier for plaintiffs to bring transnational cases in 
U.S. courts before Morrison, the pre-Morrison period functions as our “control” setting for 
where Morrison does not apply. Additionally, the bright-line character of the Morrison rule 
permits us to estimate which pre-Morrison plaintiffs would have failed this test, thus enabling us 
to ask how cases brought before Morrison would have fared when “treated” with the Morrison 
rule. 
 
Using this approach, we analyze the extent to which Morrison changed the type of non-
U.S. firms subjected to a class action suit under Rule 10b-5.  Our findings are perhaps 
surprising.16  
 
The first question we analyze is the impact of Morrison on overall litigation risk against 
Foreign Listed Firms.  For Morrison to address the concern that foreign issuers were being 
targeted too frequently, it should have reduced their litigation exposure.  One of the driving 
                                               
14 Our choice to focus on foreign firms that have their securities traded on at least one non-U.S. exchange has the 
effect of excluding from our core analyses those 10b-5 suits commenced against non-U.S. issuers whose sole trading 
venue was either a U.S. exchange or the over-the-counter market.  We exclude these firms from our core analyses 
because Morrison did not change their overall exposure to a Rule 10b-5 class action suit. For instance, in the case of 
foreign firms that traded solely on a U.S. exchange, all investors would satisfy Morrison’s transactional test, and in 
the case of foreign firms that traded only on the over-the-counter market, investors would be unable to bring a fraud-
on-the-market claim either before or after Morrison.  
15 In addition, various factors unrelated to Morrison may have affected the litigation environment subsequent to 
2010, perhaps most notably, the lingering effects of the 2008 financial crisis.  Although we cannot control for these 
changes, we report general descriptive statistics of overall securities litigation in an effort to identify their potential 
impact.     
16 [This sentence seems to be missing something…]Although other commentators have observed that, despite 
Morrison’s hype, it does not appear to have reduced securities fraud litigation against foreign issuers.  See, e.g., 
David Topol & Margaret Thomas, Post-Morrison Application of U.S. Securities Laws to Foreign Issuers, THE D&O 
DIARY, Mar. 6, 2017, available at  https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/03/articles/securities-litigation/guest-post-
post-morrison-application-u-s-securities-laws-foreign-issuers/ (observing that, despite Morrison, “filings against 
foreign issuers continue to increase each year”). 
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forces behind Morrison was the idea that foreign firms with no connection to the U.S. were being 
targeted with burdensome U.S. litigation. We thus theorize that prior to Morrison, plaintiffs did 
not focus on whether an issuer had a U.S. listing, but that Morrison’s requirement that Rule 10b-
5 actions be limited to “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges and domestic 
transactions in other securities” should have caused plaintiffs to focus their efforts on foreign 
firms that had securities listed on a U.S. exchange.   
 
Consistent with this position, we confirm that class action suits against foreign issuers 
after Morrison were almost entirely confined to those issuers having a U.S. exchange listing at 
some point during the class period. Moreover, conditional on a firm having a U.S. exchange 
listing, Rule 10b-5 cases brought after Morrison consistently defined a class period that fully 
coincided with the period when the issuer maintained its U.S. listing.  However, surprisingly, the 
focus of filed cases on firms with a U.S. listing did not represent a significant shift from the pre-
Morrison era.  Ninety percent of pre-Morrison cases were filed against Foreign Listed Firms 
with a U.S. exchange listing, and nearly all of them alleged a class period that fully coincided 
with the period when the issuer maintained its U.S. listing.   Moreover, although roughly 10% of 
pre-Morrison cases against Foreign Listed Firms were against firms that lacked any U.S. 
exchange listing, that percentage is statistically indistinguishable from the fraction of post-
Morrison defendants in our sample that lacked any U.S. exchange listing during the class 
period.17  Thus, we find that Morrison did not change the type of firm likely to be sued.   
 
For Foreign Listed Firms having a U.S. exchange listing, we further examine the dollar 
volume of trading on U.S. exchanges relative to their domestic, local exchanges during the class 
period. Because Morrison limits the class of Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs to those who acquired 
securities on a U.S. exchange, the decision should have reduced the risk of Rule 10b-5 litigation 
for Foreign Listed Firms having low volumes of U.S-exchange trading because it reduced the 
level of recoverable Rule 10b-5 damages. For similar reasons, Foreign Listed Firms having 
higher levels of U.S. trading volume should be more attractive Rule 10b-5 defendants, all else 
equal.  Within our sample, there does appear to be some evidence of this dynamic.  The median 
volume of U.S. exchange trading among these firms during the class period in post-Morrison 
cases was $11.8 billion, compared to $4.95 billion before it.18  Yet our data also reveal that both 
before and after Morrison, cases were routinely brought against Foreign Listed Firms whose U.S. 
trading volume was substantially less than these amounts. For instance, following Morrison, 
there were Rule 10b-5 actions filed against Foreign Listed Firms with a U.S. exchange trading 
volume of just $1.8 million over the entire the class period—an amount that was less than the 
U.S. dollar volume of trading for the class period of every pre-Morrison Rule 10b-5 defendant 
that maintained a U.S. exchange listing.  In combination, these findings undermine claims that 
10b-5 cases prior to Morrison focused on Foreign Listed Firms having little or no connection to 
the U.S. capital markets, or that Morrison substantially changed the composition of Rule 10b-5 
defendants.  
 
Finally, we assess overall trends with respect to case outcomes and attorneys’ fees during 
our sample period. Overall, we find limited evidence of differences in settlement and dismissal 
rates.  Dismissal rates increased slightly after Morrison, but the dismissals do not appear to be 
                                               
17 In both cases, the defendants’ securities traded in the U.S. over-the-counter market. 
18 Dollar figures throughout this paper have been inflation-adjusted using the CPI index to reflect 2018 prices. 
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predicated on the Morrison issue. The median settlement amount actually increased from $13 
million to over $15 million.  This latter result contrasts with prior work which found a decline in 
both mean and median settlement amounts following Morrison.19  Among 10b-5 suits against 
Foreign Listed Firms, we also find that overall attorneys’ fees awarded to plaintiffs’ counsel 
increased in cases following Morrison (at least where fees had been awarded through the date of 
this study). In particular, mean (median) fee awards increased from approximately $11 million 
($2.8 million) in our pre-Morrison cases to $26 million ($4.4 million) in our post-Morrison 
cases.  
 
In Part III we identify the implications of our research for securities litigation generally as 
well as Congress’ rushed response to Morrison.20  Our results are at first blush counter-intuitive.  
Morrison was widely reported to foreclose an important class of Rule 10b-5 cases against foreign 
issuers.  However, our findings show that there is little evidence either that the “problem” 
Morrison was meant to target existed or that Morrison effected a material change in the types of 
issuers targeted or cases brought.  Litigation appears to have continued at the same rates pre- and 
post- Morrison with similar size settlements, dismissal rates and attorneys’ fees.   
 
What then explains the Morrison decision and the surrounding hype? We believe the 
most straight-forward explanation is that, despite contemporary characterizations of the case as 
responding to a “burgeoning” area of Rule 10b-5 litigation against foreign issuers lacking any 
meaningful U.S. presence, Morrison was effectively a preemptive ruling.  Morrison responded to 
a handful of cases and the potential expansion of Rule 10b-5 liability that they represented.   
 
In the years preceding Morrison, there were a small number of global class actions 
litigated in the U.S., in which plaintiffs’ counsel used the presence of U.S. transactions as a 
jurisdictional hook to bring so-called global class actions that asserted claims on behalf of both 
U.S. investors and foreign investors worldwide.  The most prominent of these cases was 
Vivendi.21  The class in Vivendi, a class that consisted primarily of foreign investors, was 
successful in establishing liability, creating a potential $9 billion judgment against Vivendi.22  
The rise of Vivendi-type cases raised the real specter, not just of massive liability exposure for 
foreign firms in the U.S. courts but the grant to all investors worldwide of the right to pursue a 
private claim for damages under the U.S. securities laws. It was this potential expansion to which 
Morrison appears to have been addressed. Indeed, a major portion of the Vivendi verdict – over 
                                               
19 Our settlement findings may appear hard to reconcile with the fact that, following the Morrison decision, a 
number of courts relied on it to grant partial dismissals – reducing the class size by dismissing the claims brought by 
foreign investors.  The explanation for this result is that, even prior to the Morrison decision, the number of global 
class actions filed was relatively small and some of those cases were dismissed based on the conduct and effects 
tests that were then in use.  As a result, global class actions were not common prior to Morrison.   
20 Because Morrison was decided only weeks before Dodd-Frank became law, Congress responded by inserting a 
provision into the statute at the last minute.  Richard Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Provision: Was it Effective, Needed or Sufficient, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 199 (2011). We discuss this infra at 
notes 73-79 and accompanying text.  
21 We discuss the two other significant outlier settlements Royal Dutch Ahold and Nortel infra at notes 46–51 and 
accompanying text.  
22 See Angelo G. Savino & Abby J. Sher, Vivendi – The Multi-Billion Dollar Impact Of Morrison On Foreign-
Cubed Securities Litigation, MONDAQ, Mar. 30, 2011, available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/127648/Insurance/Vivendi+The+MultiBillion+Dollar+Impact+Of+Morrison
+On+ForeignCubed+Securities+Litigation+ 
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$7 billion -- was ultimately dismissed on Morrison grounds.  The eventual plaintiff class, which 
consisted only of investors who purchased Vivendi securities in the United States, settled their 
claims for approximately $78 million.23  
 
While Morrison makes it difficult to bring a 10b-5 action against a foreign issuer with no 
U.S. exchange listing, our analysis suggests these cases were extraordinarily unlikely before 
Morrison. The typical foreign firm defendant prior to Morrison was one that had a U.S. 
exchange listing, and Morrison did not eliminate or even reduce litigation against these types of 
foreign issuers.  To the contrary, the transaction-based approach articulated by the Morrison 
court continues to subject such issuers to potential liability, including liability for fraudulent 
statements and activities conducted abroad. To the extent Morrison is described as a 
“steamroller” of litigation against foreign issuers, it is simply a myth.  
 
How then should we understand Morrison?  We argue here that, rather than a decision 
about the extraterritorial application of Rule 10b-5, Morrison can be better understood as 
implementing a proportionality approach in which a foreign issuer’s liability exposure is 
proportionate to the extent of its presence in the U.S. capital markets.  We demonstrate that this 
reasoning is consistent with the SEC’s regulatory approach to foreign private issuers, as well as 
statutory limitations on the scope of the analogous liability provisions of the Securities Act of 
1933.    
 
Ultimately, our analysis and findings suggest that the rhetoric surrounding Morrison’s 
analysis of extraterritoriality may be overstated.  At its core, Morrison is not fundamentally 
about which issuers are subject to the antifraud provision of the federal securities laws, but about 
the universe of investors who have standing to advance an antifraud claim.  To the extent that 
commentators and subsequent courts have relied on Morrison as authority for foreclosing the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law, that reliance is misplaced. 
 
I. Background  
 
a. The Global Listings Market 
 
The globalization of the securities markets has led to dramatic growth in cross-border 
investing.  U.S. investors increasingly purchase the securities of foreign issuers for a variety of 
reasons such as obtaining greater diversification, investing in prominent multi-national 
companies that are headquartered abroad, and investing in businesses and industries that are 
located primarily outside the United States.24 
  
                                               
23 Jonathan Stempel, Vivendi ends 15-year U.S. lawsuit over big merger, to pay $26.4 million, Reuters, Apr. 6, 2017, 
available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vivendi-settlement-idUSKBN1782RQ. 
24 For purposes of this Article, we consider foreign issuers to be issuers that are headquartered outside of the United 
States.  The ordinary shares of most foreign issuers, including the foreign issuers on which we will focus most of our 
analysis, are traded on a primary exchange outside the United States such as the London Stock Exchange.  
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U.S. investors can purchase the securities of foreign issuers in several ways.25  First, for 
foreign firms without a U.S. exchange listing, investors can buy the shares directly on the foreign 
exchange.  Second, in some cases, a foreign issuer may have shares that are listed on a U.S. 
exchange.  The U.S. listing might represent an issuer’s exclusive exchange listing or a cross-
listing in addition to an exchange listing in another jurisdiction.26  The U.S.-listed securities may 
be ordinary shares,27 but more commonly are American Depository Receipts (ADRs).28  Finally, 
in some cases, U.S. investors can purchase a foreign firm’s ordinary shares or ADRs that are not 
listed on a U.S. exchange through the over-the-counter market.29   
 
In reality, this trading is bifurcated depending upon the type of purchaser.  For the most 
part retail investors are foreclosed from purchasing shares on a foreign exchange due to 
limitations on foreign trading in the United States through U.S. broker/dealers.30 Thus, retail 
investors almost exclusively buy shares of foreign issuers in the United States on U.S. exchanges 
and do not purchase shares of companies that are not listed or traded in the United States.31  
Conversely, institutional and other sophisticated investors are able to purchase shares abroad, 
                                               
25 See also Schwab Center for Financial Research, Cross-Listed International Stocks: Another Investing Alternative, 
May 23, 2014, available at https://perma.cc/NTJ7-MEM6 (describing options for U.S. investors who want to invest 
in international stocks). 
26 The terms dual-listing, cross-listing and multiple listing are often used interchangeably.  Technically, the term 
cross-listing refers to circumstances in which a single issuer lists its shares on more than one exchange.  In such 
cases, the exchange on which most of the issuers’ securities are traded is known as the primary exchange, and any 
other exchange is referred to as a secondary exchange.   
27 Most cross-listed ordinary shares are securities of Canadian issuers.  See https://perma.cc/NTJ7-MEM6  In a small 
number of cases, foreign issuers create global registered shares.  Global shares or GRSs are ordinary shares that can 
be traded in multiple jurisdictions without the need for currency conversion.  See, e.g., UBS Investor Relations, 
Frequently asked questions UBS share, https://www.ubs.com/global/en/about_ubs/investor_relations/faq/share.html 
(explaining GRSs). Daimler Chrysler and UBS are among the foreign issuers that have issued GRSs.  See G. 
Andrew Karolyi, DaimlerChrysler AG, The First Truly Global Share, 
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=97411010609109610501611108808702109009007805704700206512
208402106810702501303107312509511203007301700805805205712200811209600707810300306601209912403
1070105029071110001115092030023067008067&EXT=pdf (describing DaimlerChrysler’s creation of the GRS 
and exploring reasons why the GRS experienced poor share price performance and substantial flowback to the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange). 
28 The terms ADR and ADS (American Depository Shares) are often used interchangeably. See SEC Office of 
Investor Education and Advocacy, Investor Bulletin: American Depositary Receipts, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/adr-bulletin.pdf. ADRs are created when a bank custodian holds foreign shares 
for the benefit of U.S. investors.  The ordinary shares, which are on deposit with the bank, are ADSs.  The bank 
issues certificates, priced in dollars, representing an interest in those ADSs, which may or may not have a one-to-one 
correspondence with the ordinary shares.  Those certificates are ADRs and may be listed on a U.S. exchange and 
traded by U.S. investors.  Technically an ADR investor does not own the underlying ordinary shares represented by 
the ADR, and that shareholders’ rights are determined in part by the contractual terms of the ADR.  ADRs can be 
sponsored or unsponsored by the issuer, and some, but not all, issuers raise capital through cross-listings.  See, e.g., 
Tom Zanki, Dual-Listed IPOs Carve A Small But Steady Niche, LAW 360, Aug. 4, 2016, available at 
https://perma.cc/FNC5-P7W5 (discussing and citing recent examples of dual-listed IPOs). 
29 The over-the-counter market is a general term used to refer to the trading in equity securities that are not listed on 
an exchange.  See generally Michael J. Simon & Robert L. D. Colby, The National Market System for Over-the-
Counter Stocks, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 19 (1986). 
30 See generally Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New 
International Framework, 48 Harvard Int’l L.J. 31, 47-49 (2007) (describing the barriers to foreign securities 
investment by retail investors located in the United States).  
31 Id. at 48. 
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something that these investors often prefer due to the lower trading costs and greater liquidity on 
these foreign exchanges.32   
 
b. Securities Fraud, Foreign Issuers and the Morrison Decision 
 
Securities fraud by foreign issuers may involve fraudulent conduct that occurs in the 
United States, overseas, or both, raising a question about the circumstances under which such 
transnational cases fall within the scope of section 10(b).  For many years, the ability of plaintiffs 
to bring securities fraud class actions against foreign issuers was governed by two legal standards 
set out by the Second Circuit.33  In Leasco and Bertch, the court held that a foreign issuer could 
be subject to Section 10(b) if it engaged in sufficient fraudulent conduct in the United States.34  
In Schoenbaum, the court held that Section 10(b) could be applied if the fraudulent transaction 
had substantial effects in the United States.35  Courts described the so-called “conduct” and 
“effects” tests as delineating the “extraterritorial reach of the antifraud provisions.”36 Although 
the conduct and effects tests were widely followed by other federal courts, a number of 
commentators criticized the resulting expansive scope of jurisdiction both as unprincipled37 and 
for opening the U.S. courts to cases that had limited ties to the United States.38 
 
The Supreme Court responded to these concerns by replacing the conduct and effects 
tests in Morrison.39  The Morrison case was publicized in the press as a so-called “F-cubed” 
case,40 in that it was brought by foreign shareholders who bought their shares on a foreign 
                                               
32 See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Do Institutional Investors Value the 10b-5 Private Right of Action? Evidence from 
Investor Trading Behavior Following Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 183, 196 (2015) 
(finding in a sample of 420 cross-listed firms that “[o]verall, just 35% of the $656 billion of cross-listed trades 
within the sample were executed on U.S. exchanges, as might be expected given the historically lower trading costs 
and higher trading liquidity available in local trading markets.”) 
33 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign Tender Offers, 87 NW. U. L. 
Rev. 523, 542-43 (1993) (describing the conduct and effects tests). 
34 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 
519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).  
35  Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). 
36 See Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 
2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 469 (2009). 
37 See, e.g., Gregory K. Matson, Note, Restricting the Jurisdiction of American Courts over Transnational Securities 
Fraud., 79 GEO. L.J. 141, 148 (1990) (terming the conduct and effects tests ‘startling in light of both the drafters' 
express purpose of perfecting domestic securities markets and the Supreme Court's 'historical approach' to statutory 
construction”)  
38 See, e.g., Ashby Jones, The Whole World is Watching: ‘F-Cubed’ Case Moves to High Court, The Wall St. J., 
Mar. 29, 2010 (quoting claim that "[e]xposing foreign companies to class actions in the United States based merely 
on the existence of an American subsidiary or listing on a U.S. exchange will discourage foreign investment here.”). 
39 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267 (2010). 
40 Prior to Morrison, commentators identified three categories of cases against foreign issuers.  The first category 
was cases against foreign domiciled issuers involving U. S. investors who purchased on U.S. exchanges.  F-squared 
cases were those brought by American investors against foreign issuers involving securities traded on a foreign 
exchange.  F-cubed cases were cases brought by foreign investors against foreign issuers involving securities traded 
on a foreign exchange.  See Kevin LaCroix, O.K., F-Cubed Claims Are Out, But What About F-Squared Claims?, 
The D&O Diary, Jul. 21, 2010, available at https://www.dandodiary.com/2010/07/articles/securities-litigation/o-k-f-
cubed-claims-are-out-but-what-about-f-squared-claims/ (explaining F-squared and F-cubed cases in the context of 
the Morrison decision). 
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exchange, against foreign issuers.41  Also known as global class actions, F-cubed lawsuits were a 
particular concern because they sought to hold liable foreign issuers with little connection to the 
United States and because they had the potential to increase the size and scope of U.S. litigation 
against foreign issuers.42   
 
The most dramatic example of the global class action was the Vivendi case, which was 
pending at the time of the Morrison decision.  The trial court in Vivendi certified a plaintiff class 
that included “all persons from the United States, France, England, and the Netherlands who 
purchased or otherwise acquired ordinary shares or American Depository Shares of Vivendi.”43 
The case was tried before a jury which found for the plaintiffs, leading the Court to enter a 
preliminary judgment which would have exceeded $9 billion.44  Prior to Vivendi, two other cases 
against foreign issuers resulted in very high settlements – Royal Dutch Ahold and Nortel.45  In 
Royal Dutch Ahold, the court certified a settlement class consisting of “All persons and entities 
who purchased and/or received as a dividend Royal Ahold N.V. common shares and/or 
American Depository Receipts from July 30, 1999 through February 23, 2003, regardless of 
where they live or where they purchased their Ahold shares” 46 and approved a settlement of $1.1 
billion.47  Nortel involved a plaintiff class included both U.S. and Canadian investors and settled 
for over $2.9 billion.48   
 
Yet even under the conduct and effects tests, it was far from clear whether a court could 
properly exercise jurisdiction in global class actions. The court identified the potential 
jurisdictional issue in Royal Ahold deciding that jurisdiction existed because the bulk of the fraud 
occurred in the United States, a finding which was not reviewed by a federal appellate court 
when the case was settled.49  Other courts addressed the question of jurisdiction more directly 
and, in some cases, declined to exercise jurisdiction over transactions occurring abroad.50  As we 
show in Section 2(c), courts routinely used the conduct and effects test to limit the class of 
investors to those having a meaningful nexus to the United States.  
                                               
41 See, e.g. Gary L. Gassman, Foreign Issuers, Foreign Exchanges: The Current State of Foreign-Cubed U.S. 
Securities Litigation, 41 THE BRIEF 10, 11 (2012). 
42 For a discussion of this issue see Buxbaum, supra note 59. 
43  In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 76, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
44 See Savino & Sher, supra note 22 (“the effect of [Morrison] will be to reduce what was projected to be a $9.0 
billion recovery by as much as 80 percent or more”). 
45 See U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Securities Class Action Litigation, Jul. 2008, at 8, available at 
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/SecuritiesBooklet.pdf (observing that Royal Ahold and 
Nortel were “two of the top ten largest settlements of all time.”)  
46 In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1928, *16 (D. Md. 2006). 
47 Id. at *48. 
48 See Nortel Networks Corporation (Nortel I & II) Securities Litigation, Stanford Law School Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse, available at http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-case.html?id=101707. The first complaint in 
the Nortel case was filed on February 16, 2001 so is not in our dataset. Id. See generally In re Nortel Networks Corp. 
Secs. Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15702 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 5, 2003) (certifying class). 
49 In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F.Supp. 334 (D. Md. 2006). See also Martha Graybow, Judge 
Oks $2.4 billion settlement in Nortel Case, THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 26, 2006. 
50 See, e.g., Blechner v. Daimler-Benz Ag, 410 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Del. 2006) (declining to exercise jurisdiction 
where the conduct did not occur primarily in the United States and the plaintiff class consisted of foreign investors) 
In re European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. Sec. Litig., 703 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying 
conduct and effects test to dismiss F-cubed lawsuit by European investors against European issuer for filings within 
the European Union). 
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Indeed in Morrison itself, the lower courts had dismissed the complaint as falling outside 
the scope of the existing Second Circuit standard.51 In his concurrence Justice Stevens 
recognized this point, writing that he would maintain the conduct and effects tests, and uphold 
the Second Circuit’s ruling on the grounds that “this case has Australia written all over it.”52  In 
this vein, it was hardly obvious that Morrison would become the test case for whether F-cubed 
cases could proceed under Section 10b-5.  
 
In addition, the characterization of Morrison as an F-cubed lawsuit is questionable. 
National Australia Bank, the defendant in the case, had ADRs listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange for the duration of the class period, as well as at the time the underlying complaint was 
brought, and the original class of plaintiffs included investors who acquired U.S. ADRs. The trial 
court, however, dismissed this class of plaintiffs for failing to allege any quantifiable damages. 
Thus, by the time the case was heard by the Supreme Court, the plaintiff class consisted entirely 
of investors in National Australia Bank’s ordinary shares purchased abroad and who lacked any 
obvious connection to the U.S.  In addition, NAB delisted its ADRs shortly after the suit was 
filed.  It was for these reasons that counsel for National Australia Bank and multiple amica were 
able to use Morrison not just to challenge the lower court’s interpretation of the conduct and 
effects tests—the approach advanced by plaintiffs in their petition for certiorari—but also as a 
vehicle to attack the use of Rule 10b-5 in F-cubed cases.53  
 
Morrison reflected a concerted effort by William Conway, III, a partner at the law firm of 
Wachtell, Lipton Rosen & Katz, to push the Supreme Court to replace the Second Circuit test.54  
This effort was supported by an array of business-friendly interests. Critics of the application of 
Section 10(b) to F-cubed claims in particular argued that burdensome U.S. securities fraud 
                                               
51 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 253.  
52 Id. at 286. 
53 Notably, because of the dismissal of the ADR holders, Morrison was debated at the Supreme Court largely in the 
context of whether Section 10(b) extended to claims by investors who purchased securities abroad.  See, e.g., 
Amicus Brief for Alecta Pensionforskring, et al., available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_1191_
PetitionerAmCuAlectaetal.authcheckdam.pdf (defending application of 10(b) to claims by foreign investors who 
traded abroad); Amicus Brief for the Australian Shareholders’ Assn, available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_1191_
PetitionerAmCuASAandACSI.authcheckdam.pdf (arguing that the Court should not allow the U.S. to be used as a 
base for fraudulent conduct affecting the interests of foreign investors). 
54 Mr. Conway argued the case for NAB and in the wake of Morrison argued for its extended application in other 
securities law areas. See Ross Todd, Architect of Morrison v. NAB Takes on Feds in Amicus Brief for NYC Bar, THE 
AMLAW LITIGATION DAILY, Sept. 12, 2012, available at 
https://www.law.com/litigationdaily/almID/1202572772363/ (detailing Mr. Conway’s efforts to argue that 
Morrison’s holding also applied in the case of criminal securities fraud claims).  To be sure, there was academic 
criticism of the Second Circuit test beforehand.  Choi & Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities 
Class–Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467–468; Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities 
Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject–Matter Jurisdiction, 9 Fordham J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 106–108, 115–116 (2004); Donald Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope of 
Antifraud Protection in an Internationalized Securities Marketplace, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 244–248 
(1992). 
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litigation deterred foreign issuers from issuing securities to U.S. residents.55 They also claimed 
that the Second Circuit test violated other nations’ sovereignty56 and conflicted with the laws of 
other jurisdictions.57 Mixed in these arguments were notions of judicial economy, that the U.S. 
courts should not be burdened with suits based upon the foreign purchase of securities.58 
 
These arguments worked.  In Morrison, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the conduct and 
effects tests as improperly giving Section 10(b) extraterritorial application and set forth a bright 
line test limiting private securities litigation to domestic transactions. Justice Scalia writing for 
the majority held that a cause of action could be brought only if “the purchase or sale of a 
security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in 
the United States.”59  The test thus purported to eliminate shareholder private causes of actions 
under Rule 10b-5 brought with respect to any foreign purchases.  
 
c. The Morrison Case and Public Reaction 
 
The Morrison decision was a controversial one.  First, it overruled longstanding Second 
Circuit precedent. Second, the repudiation of this Second Circuit test was vigorously opposed by 
many institutional investors and shareholder advocates.60  Among the reasons for this opposition 
was that the ruling eliminated not only “F-cubed” cases but also “F-squared” cases—that is, 
cases brought by U.S. domiciled investors who bought their shares in the foreign companies on 
foreign exchanges.61  As a result, Morrison deprived U.S. investors of the antifraud remedy in 
                                               
55 See Amicus Brief of NYSE Euronext at 3, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/02/Morrison.NYSE-Euronext-in-Support-of-Resp.pdf, (“Issuers worldwide have repeatedly 
expressed concern to NYSE Euronext that the risk of U.S. litigation has deterred them from raising capital in the 
U.S.”). 
56 See, e.g., Amicus Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_1191_
RespondentAmCuUnitedKingdom.authcheckdam.pdf, at 2 (arguing that “the broad assertion of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by United States courts implicates the legitimate sovereign interests and policy choices of the United 
Kingdom.”). 
57 See Amicus Brief of the Republic of France, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/02/Morrison.Republic-of-France-in-Support-of-REsp.pdf, at 4 (explaining that “certain 
aspects of the U.S. approach conflict with specific legal rules of foreign nations.”). 
58 See Amicus Brief for Law Professors, available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_1191_
RespondentAmCuLawProfs.authcheckdam.pdf , at 28 (arguing that “allowing traders in foreign markets to sue 
under section 10(b) will burden United States courts and make the United States a venue for global securities 
litigation”) 
59 Morrison, 561 U.S at 273.  Hannah Buxbaum had previously advocated the approach adopted by Morrison Court.  
See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional 
Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 68 (2007) (“the best alternative may be to adopt a rule that simply limits 
subject-matter jurisdiction under the anti-fraud provisions to claims arising out of transactions on U.S. markets”). 
60 See, e.g., Christian J. Ward, et al., Council for Institutional Investors, Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
The Impact on Institutional Investors (Feb. 2012), 7 ((“the limitation on [Morrison’s] reach seriously affects 
investors’ remedies for fraud.”) available at 
https://www.cii.org/files/publications/white_papers/02_02_12_morrison_v_national_australia_bank.pdf. 
61 See, e.g., Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to a Flame - International Securities Litigation after Morrison: 
Correcting the Supreme Court's Transactional Test, 52, VA. J. INT. L. 405, 408 (2012) (observing that “Morrison 
can deprive American investors who buy securities from an American issuer of the protections of the securities laws 
merely because the transaction occurs abroad.”) 
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circumstances in which they purchased their securities abroad.  Shareholder advocates argued 
U.S. institutional investors commonly acquire securities in foreign markets, either because these 
are the only markets where they can seek international diversification or because these markets 
are generally more liquid than the U.S. ADR market (where foreign firms often cross-list their 
shares).62  Accordingly, these investors claimed that Morrison deprived them of their ability to 
use Rule 10b-5 to combat fraud.63  For similar reasons, these investors claimed the decision 
could incentivize foreign issuers to adjust their conduct to ensure that security issuances occurred 
abroad in order to deprive U.S. holders of the protections of Section 10b and Rule 10b-5.64  
 
In the months following the decision, there was almost uniform agreement that Morrison 
marked a sea-change in securities litigation with one author writing that the “world of securities 
fraud litigation was irrevocably altered . . .  .”65  In Morrison’s wake, memos and other writings 
appeared to hail the decision as an end to foreign securities litigation.  Morrison was also 
described as  “dramatically” changing the litigation landscape for foreign issuers.66 Most notably, 
the Morrison decision resulted in the dismissal of investors who purchased their securities 
abroad from the Vivendi case, which was pending at the time of Morrison and which had the 
potential to result in the largest-ever private securities fraud judgment.67  Marc I. Steinberg and 
Kelly Flanagan wrote to say that Morrison “drastically altered the landscape for transnational 
                                               
62 Ward et al., supra note 60, at 10. 
63 Id. at 11 (“Morrison’s transactional test, however, creates new incentives for issuers to withdraw from American 
stock markets.”). 
64  Morrison did not involve an SEC enforcement action.  See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2894 n.12 (Stevens, J., 
concurring) ("The Court's opinion does not, however, foreclose the [SEC] from bringing enforcement actions in 
additional circumstances, as no issue concerning the [SEC's] authority is presented by this case.").  Nonetheless, a 
variety of commentators argued that the Court’s analysis implicated the scope of the SEC’s regulatory authority.  
See, e.g., Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Applicability to SEC of Private Action Requirements in § 10(b) 
Cases, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 11, 2010, at 3 ("In light of the Court's rationale and its holding . . . it is difficult to see how the 
SEC would not [be] subject to the Morrison analysis.").  Congress responded to this concern in the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Consumer Protection Act of 2010.  See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text; see also Nidhi M. 
Geevarghese, A Shocking Loss of Investor Protection: The Implications of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 6 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 235, 249-50 (2011) (exploring congressional response).   
65 See Vladislava Soshkina, Beyond Morrison: The Effect of the “Presumption Against Extraterritoriality” and the 
Transactional Test on Foreign Tender Offers, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 281 (2012). 
66 See Cravath, Swaine & Moore, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. – The U.S. Supreme Court Confirms that 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act Does Not Apply Extraterritorially & Dismisses the Claims of “F-
Cubed” Plaintiffs, Jul. 6, 2010 (“The Supreme Court’s June 24, 2010, opinion in Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. __ (2010), has narrowed dramatically the scope of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder”), available at 
https://www.cravath.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Publications/3225362_1.pdf; Davis Polk Client Newsflash, 
Update: U.S. Supreme Court Limits Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities Laws— Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank, Jun. 28, 2010, available at https://www.davispolk.com/files/files/Publication/b8410ed8-13e1-40b0-
8f12-033b6ea69c83/Preview/PublicationAttachment/450c2bc3-1d4e-4440-9cd5-
a3eff5e1dd2e/062510_morrison_v_nab.html (“The Court's decision should be a positive development for non-U.S. 
issuers because it precludes plaintiffs from bringing federal securities fraud claims with respect to the purchase or 
sale of their securities on foreign exchanges or otherwise outside the United States”).  See also David He, Beyond 
Securities Fraud: The Territorial Reach of the U.S. Laws After Morrison v. N.A.B., 2013 COLUMBIA BUS. L. REV. 
148, 169 (“The majority in Morrison undertook an analysis that went far beyond the circumstances of the case and 
severely limited the ability of plaintiffs to seek recourse through private securities fraud litigation”) 
67 See Court Finds Vivendi Liable for Misleading Investors, THE N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010 at B3.  (reporting that 
the potential judgment in Vivendi of $9.3 billion was potentially “the largest securities class-action jury verdict in 
history”). 
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securities litigation and the way that courts determine proper application of a statute concerning a 
transnational claim.”68 
 
Morrison’s broad language about extraterritoriality also had broad effects, effects that 
extend well beyond private securities fraud litigation.  The Morrison decision has influenced the 
interpretation of statutes in a wide range of contexts,69 from the alien tort statute70 to the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).71 In each of these cases the courts 
applied the Morrison holding to consider whether a federal statute should have extraterritorial 
application. The results have been to limit the scope of U.S. jurisdiction. Indeed, in one 
particularly controversial decision, the Second Circuit applied the Morrison decision to hold that 
a criminal conviction for securities fraud under Section 10b can only be sustained if the person 
“engaged in fraud in connection with (1) a security listed on a U.S. exchange, or (2) a security 
purchased or sold in the United States.”72 
 
The controversial nature of the Morrison decision was quickly highlighted when only a 
few months later Congress in the Dodd-Frank Act sought to restore the SEC’s authority to bring 
suit to enforce Section 10b and Rule 10b-5 subject only to constitutional limitations on the 
exercise of jurisdiction.73  Although it was not clear that the provision in Dodd-Frank was either 
necessary or that it was drafted appropriately to resolve any ambiguity about regulators’ 
enforcement authority,74 Congress appears to have taken the view that Morrison threatened such 
authority.75 
 
In Dodd-Frank, Congress also ordered the SEC to conduct a study to determine the extent 
to which private rights of action should be extended to the same conduct for which Section 929P 
authorized government enforcement actions.76 The SEC performed this study, and the results  
                                               
68 Marc I. Steinberg & Kelly Flanagan, Transnational Dealings – Morrison Continues to Make Waves, 46 MORRISON 
829, 829 (Fall 2012).  
69 See also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (relying on Morrison to reach a restrictive view of California’s 
power to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign company). 
70 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
71 Gideon Mark, RICO's Extraterritoriality, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 543 (2013).  
72 United States v. Vilar, 2013 WL 4608948 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013). 
73 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1871 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd -Frank Act].  As one commentator has noted, the Dodd-Frank provision was “hastily 
drafted” because “Morrison was decided only weeks before the Act became law.”  Painter, supra note 20, at 199.  
Immediately after passage of the bill, Mr. Conway issued a client note from his law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & 
Katz arguing that the provision did not overturn Morrison due to a drafting error amounting to a “fatal omission”. 
See George T. Conway III, Extraterritoriality of the Federal Securities Laws After Dodd-Frank: Partly 
Because of a Drafting Error, the Status Quo Should Remain Unchanged, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz  
 (June 21, 2010) available at  
http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.17763.10.pdf 
74 See Painter, supra note 20, at 229.  (concluding that “Congress passed a poorly drafted provision that may not do 
anything other than confer jurisdiction that courts already have, although Congress probably intended for it to do 
more”) 
75 See, e.g., SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1292 (D. Utah 2017) (recounting legislation 
history of Section 929(P)(b) of Dodd-Frank).  
76 See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 73, at 929P. 
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seemed to confirm the continued dispute over the scope and desirability of the Morrison rule.77  
In that study the SEC received 72 comment letters, 44 of which supported the old Second Circuit 
test or a modified version thereof, and 23 which supported the Morrison test.78  The study did not 
reach a conclusion as to whether private litigation should be expanded, explaining: “the 
conflicting evidence in the academic literature and the results of our event study on the Morrison 
decision are inconclusive as to the net benefits or costs of a cross-border extension of private 
rights of action.”79   
 
D. Morrison and Academic Study 
 
Academic commentary regarding the effects of Morrison has similarly been mixed.  
Several studies have examined the impact of Morrison on asset prices and investor trading 
behavior.  Positing that Morrison’s wholesale rejection of the conduct and effects test was 
largely unexpected, Professors Gagnon and Karolyi examine stock price reactions surrounding 
the publication of the Morrison decision to gauge investors’ reactions to the new rule.80  
Focusing on nearly 1,000 foreign firms that were listed on both a U.S. exchange and a domestic 
venue, they find that publication of the decision was associated with a positive return of 44 basis 
points for firms’ U.S.-listed securities relative to their locally-traded securities.81 They interpret 
these results as evidence that market participants revalued the newly differentiated application of 
the anti-fraud provisions of Rule 10b-5 to investors in a firm’s ADRs relative to its home-market 
shares.82  
 
Using a similar research design, Professors Licht, Poliquin, Siegel & Li (LPSL) likewise 
examine stock price reactions to cross-listed firms but focus on stock price movements 
surrounding the time of the oral arguments for Morrison when they posit the Court signaled its 
willingness to discard the conduct and effects test.83  Overall, LPSL fail to find any negative 
market reaction to this event in either the U.S. or local markets.  On the contrary, they find that 
U.S.-listed foreign firms experienced insignificant or even positive abnormal returns in both 
markets, particularly among firms having most of their equity traded outside the U.S. The 
authors conclude that these findings are consistent with the idea that a “U.S.-style securities- 
fraud class action regime could be viewed as a regulatory burden for firms. ”84 These results are 
also consistent with the findings of Professor Robert Bartlett who, using a proprietary dataset of 
378 institutional investor trades, examines institutional investor trading during the thirty-month 
period surrounding Morrison. Despite the fact that Morrison made clear that trades in U.S.-
exchange listed securities now come with the right to pursue a private Rule 10b-5 action, 
                                               
77 See Securities and Exchange Commission Staff, Study on the Cross-Border Scope of the Private Right of Action 
Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (April 2012). 
78 Id. at 38. 
79 Id. at B13. 
80 See Louis Gagnon and George Andrew Karolyi, An Unexpected Test of the Bonding Hypothesis (October 20, 
2017). Johnson School Research Paper Series No. 50-2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1961178 
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1961178  
81 Id. at 3. 
82 Id. at 5-8. 
83 Amir N. Licht, Christopher Poliquin, Jordan I. Siege & Li Xi, What makes the bonding stick? A natural 
experiment involving the U.S. Supreme Court and cross-listed firm, 129(2) J. FIN. ECON. 329 (2018). 
84 Id. at 330. 
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Professor Bartlett finds investors in his sample did not reallocate trades to the U.S.-listed 
securities of cross-listed foreign firms following the decision.85 
 
Professor Yuliya Guseva takes a different approach in assessing the practical effect of 
Morrison on 10b-5 litigation. Professor Guseva analyzes 222 10b-5 cases brought against foreign 
private issuers in the five years before and five years after Morrison was decided.86  While 
Professor Guseva finds that F-cubed cases were “rare” prior to the Morrison case,87 she also 
finds that settlement amounts within her sample declined in the wake of Morrison and that 
dismissals rose.  Because damages arising from share acquisitions on non-U.S. venues are no 
longer recoverable after Morrison, these latter findings are consistent with Morrison placing 
plaintiffs in a weaker negotiating position, perhaps because pre-Morrison cases commonly 
included a worldwide class of shareholders who acquired most of their shares on non-U.S. 
venues. Professor Guseva also finds that the liability exposure of foreign issuers became more 
“ascertainable” post-Morrison, as it was capped by the extent to which they have accessed the 
U.S. capital markets. 88  To the extent this was the case, the limitation of Rule 10b-5 protection to 
shares acquired on a U.S.-exchange would constitute a clear reduction in the way in which Rule 
10b-5 was used prior to Morrison, consistent with the conventional wisdom.  
 
However, Guseva’s dataset lacks information concerning the relative levels of U.S. and 
foreign trading volume among cross-listed firms, making it impossible to discern whether pre-
Morrison cases commonly consisted of foreign firms with de minimis U.S. exchange trading. 
Guseva’s dataset also includes defendants headquartered in China.89  Yet, the litigation involving 
Chinese firms is distinctive.  Most notably, the post-Morrison era coincided with a wave of Rule 
10b-5 claims against small U.S.-exchange traded Chinese firms that often obtained their 
exchange-listing through a reverse merger with a non-operating shell corporation utilizing 
allegedly misleading disclosures. The presence of these small, reverse-merger cases potentially 
confounds Guseva’s settlement analysis and highlights the challenge of simply comparing the 
pre- and post-Morrison litigation environments.  Professor Guseva also does not distinguish 
between firms that are listed exclusively on a U.S. exchange and firms with cross-listed 
securities.  As we explain below, the Morrison decision should have had no impact on the latter 
set of firms.   
 
The gaps in Professor Guseva’s analysis and the conflicting findings of the finance 
studies suggest that it would be beneficial to examine Rule 10b-5 litigation filed against foreign 
issuers in the years surrounding Morrison to understand more precisely how the case 
transformed transnational securities litigation.  Significantly, the foregoing research designs do 
not distinguish between the effect of Morrison in eliminating an existing practice of bringing 
Rule 10b-5 suits that focused on the acquisition of a foreign issuer’s non-US securities (such as 
                                               
85 Bartlett, supra note 32, at 186-187. 
86 Yuliya Guseva, Extraterritoriality of Securities Law Redux: Litigation Five Years after Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank, 2017 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 199.  
87 Id. at 261. 
88 Id. at 279. Professor Guseva analyzed a sample of 75 cases from an earlier time period in another paper and 
concluded that foreign private issuers were subject to considerable uncertainty as to the extent of their potential 
liability exposure.  See Yuliya Guseva, Cross-Listings and the New World of International Capital: Another Look at 
the Efficiency and Extraterritoriality of Securities Law, 44 GEO. J. INT. L. 411 (2013).  
89 See Yuseva, supra note 86, at 256. 
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in an F-cubed or F-squared lawsuit) from the possibility that Morrison eliminated the prospect 
that global class actions would become widespread in the future.90  
 
 
II. Data and Empirical Analysis 
 
To assess the effect of Morrison on Rule 10b-5 litigation practices, we follow Professor 
Guseva in examining Rule 10b-5 cases in the years surrounding Morrison, though our 
methodology differs in several respects.  First, we focus primarily on foreign issuers that were 
subject to U.S. litigation pre- and post-Morrison, in order to interrogate the extent to which 
Morrison reduced the litigation burden on this set of issuers.  Second, in examining case 
outcomes surrounding Morrison, we expressly account for the large number of Rule 10b-5 cases 
brought during the post-Morrison time period against small Chinese firms whose shares were 
listed exclusively on U.S. venues. Third, and most importantly, we distinguish between foreign 
firms whose securities are listed exclusively on a U.S. exchange and those that met our definition 
of a Foreign Listed Firm. 
 
a. Data 
 
Our sample of Rule 10b-5 cases comes from the Stanford Securities Litigation 
Clearinghouse, which tracks all securities class action lawsuits filed in federal court since 
January 1, 1996.  We collect all cases filed between January 2002 and December 2017, dropping 
all cases that do not involve securities fraud, and more specifically, do not plead Section 10(b) 
allegations. We further filter cases to identify those cases that were filed against a corporate 
issuer having its headquarters located outside of the United States. Our final sample consists of 
388 suits filed between 2002 and 2017.  
 
We hand-collect information from the Clearinghouse and court dockets on a variety of 
metrics surrounding each case. In particular, we obtain information from Bloomberg and CRSP 
regarding whether a defendant firm’s shares were traded on any U.S. or non-U.S. exchanges and 
the dollar volume of trading on each trading venue during the class period specified in the 
complaint.  We obtain data regarding the characteristics of the defendant firm and the lawsuit 
directly from court filings and Edgar.  
 
In Table 1, we summarize the distribution of our sample cases by year of filing.   
 
Table 1: Sample Cases by Year of Filing 
    
All Cases in Sample 
  All Cases in Sample   All Cases in Stanford  
with Non-US Listing 
Listing) 
 Litigation Clearinghouse 
Year 
 
N % 
 
N %  N % 
2002 
 
19 4.90% 
 
12 6.56%  265 
 
7.94% 
                                               
90 Likewise, while LPSL suggest that foreign firms having little U.S. trading volume experienced positive abnormal 
returns due to their reduced risk of Rule 10b-5 exposure following Morrison, their research design cannot speak to 
whether the market reaction was due to existing Rule 10b-5 practices.  For instance, was their finding due to the fact 
that these firms were subject to large levels of Rule 10b-5 exposure before Morrison but would no longer bear such 
risks because of the lower settlement value these cases offered to plaintiffs and their counsel?  Or was it the case that 
these firms were never the subject of meaningful levels of 10b-5 litigation, suggesting that the market’s reaction was 
primarily driven by the reduced possibility that these firms would be subject to 10b-5 litigation in the future? 
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2003 
 
13 3.35% 
 
9 4.92%  228                        
239 
6.83% 
2004 
 
25 6.44% 
 
15 8.20%  
 
7.16% 
2005 
 
17 4.38% 
 
10 5.46%  182 5.45% 
2006 
 
10 2.58% 
 
2 1.09%  121 
 
3.62% 
2007 
 
19 4.90% 
 
11 6.01%  177 
223 
5.30% 
2008 
 
21 5.41% 
 
18 9.84%  6.68% 
2009 
 
9 2.32% 
 
7 3.83%  165 4.94% 
2010 
 
17 4.38% 
 
3 1.64%  175 5.24% 
2011 
 
50 12.89% 
 
11 6.01%  188 5.63% 
2012 
 
24 6.19% 
 
11 6.01%  151 4.52% 
2013 
 
25 6.44% 
 
14 7.65%  165 4.94% 
2014 
 
25 6.44% 
 
8 4.37%  168 5.03% 
2015 
 
31 7.99% 
 
8 4.37%  208 6.23% 
2016 
 
37 9.54% 
 
21 11.48%  271 8.12% 
2017   46 11.86%   23 12.57%  412 12.34% 
Total: 
 
388 100% 
 
183 100%  3,338 100% 
Total Pre-Morrison: 
 
141 36.34% 
 
87 47.54%  1,663 53.18% 
Total Post-Morrison: 
 
246 63.66% 
 
93 52.46%  1,675 46.82% 
 
 
The first column presents the number of cases in our sample, regardless of whether the 
defendant had a trading venue outside of the U.S. Importantly, even if a firm is headquartered 
outside of the U.S., it is possible for the issuer to trade principally or even exclusively on a U.S. 
trading venue or exchange. This practice is commonly observed among technology firms based 
in China and Israel that often incorporate in the United States and arrange to have their ordinary 
shares trade exclusively on a U.S. stock exchange. Data in the first column thus commingles 
foreign-based firms whose equity can be acquired on non-U.S. venues with foreign-based firms 
whose equity can only be acquired on a U.S. exchange or in the U.S. OTC market.91   
 
Firms whose equity can only be acquired on a U.S. exchange should not have been 
affected by the Morrison decision because investors in these firms necessarily satisfy the 
Morrison test by acquiring their shares on a U.S. exchange.92 We confirm this conclusion in 
Section II(c) when we examine case outcomes.  Columns 3 and 4 therefore summarize all 
lawsuits for the subset of foreign defendant firms whose equity traded on at least one non-U.S. 
venue.  These firms, which we refer to as “Foreign Listed Firms,” were most directly affected by 
the Morrison rule insofar that investors in these firms could have acquired their securities on a 
non-U.S. exchange and would therefore fail the first prong of Morrison’s transaction test. 
Accordingly, we focus much of our analysis on this group of companies.   
 
Finally, in Columns 5 and 6 we examine overall litigation rates in order to explore if the 
general litigation environment changed both pre- and post- Morrison.  We find that the litigation 
rates for all securities litigation as recorded by the Stanford Litigation Clearinghouse are roughly 
similar to those related to foreign firms.  53.18% of all securities cases were brought pre-
Morrison while 46.82% were brought post-Morrison.  In unreported tests we compare the 
                                               
91 Among the 205 foreign firms in our sample that did not have a local trading market, only three traded exclusively 
in the U.S. over-the-counter market. 
92 Where a foreign firm’s securities trade exclusive in the U.S. OTC market, we surmise that investors in these firms 
would most likely satisfy the second prong of Morrison.  Consistent with this conclusion, all three of these cases 
noted in n. 91 were commenced following Morrison’s publication; however, Morrison was raised in only one of 
these cases in an effort by the defendant issuer to dismiss investors who acquired their shares in an offshore, 
Regulation S offering of the company’s securities 
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percentage of foreign securities litigation to all litigation and find no statistical change in 
percentages or comparative rates of litigation over the sample time period. 
 
Finally, in Figure 1 we examine the proportion of lawsuits within our full sample that 
named as a defendant a firm headquartered in China.  As noted previously, a large number of 
10b-5 cases were brought against Chinese based firms following Morrison, stemming in part 
from a wave of reverse mergers involving these companies in the years surrounding the decision. 
As highlighted in Figure 1, cases involving Chinese firms were especially prominent in 2010 and 
2011, representing over 60% of all private 10b-5 cases brought against non-U.S. firms in those 
years.93  Notably, as we show below, these firms had market capitalizations that were generally 
smaller than other firms within our sample, suggesting that recoverable 10b-5 damages would 
also be lower than in 10b-5 cases against larger firms.  At the same time, nearly all of these 
defendant firms’ securities traded exclusively on a U.S. stock exchange and, consequently, their 
exposure to a 10b-5 lawsuit was unlikely to have been reduced by Morrison.   These cases thus 
represent a potentially confounding factor in prior studies of Morrison that do not expressly 
grapple with the fact that foreign firms that trade exclusively on U.S. exchanges were largely 
unaffected by the decision. We return to this topic again in Section II(c). 
 
 
 
b. Morrison and the Risk of a 10b-5 Lawsuit for Foreign Issuers 
 
We first examine the extent to which Morrison changed the risk of facing a Rule 10b-5 
class action lawsuit for non-U.S. issuers.  As a general matter, Morrison should have reduced the 
viability of a Rule 10b-5 lawsuit by U.S. and foreign investors who acquired their securities 
                                               
93 Of these cases, we classify fifty-two as involving reverse mergers. 
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outside the United States (i.e., so called “F-squared” and “F-cubed” cases) given, as discussed 
previously, the Morrison ruling was designed to exclude these investors from the protections of 
Rule 10b-5.  Nonetheless, Morrison did not prevent foreign issuers from being sued in 
connection with transactions that occurred in the United States.  Accordingly, the question after 
Morrison was the extent to which foreign purchasers were a meaningful part of Rule 10b-5 
litigation prior to Morrison or whether Morrison was responsive to a possible, but as-yet 
unrealized, risk.   
 
At the same time, Morrison purports to be about the likelihood that a foreign issuer 
would be subject to suit in the United States for federal securities fraud. The data in Columns 3 
and 4 of Table 1 reveal no clear decline in the total number of suits against Foreign Listed Firms.  
However, we lack information on whether the baseline level of fraudulent conduct remained 
constant over our sample period. Therefore, these overall data leave open the possibility that F-
squared and F-cubed cases were common before Morrison and that simply more cases would 
have been brought after 2010 had Morrison not been decided. 
 
We hypothesize that Morrison should not have affected litigation against foreign issuers 
whose securities traded exclusively on a U.S. exchange and that its impact should be limited to 
Foreign Listed Firms.94  We therefore begin our analysis by examining the exchange listings of 
the 183 Foreign Listed Firms in our sample.  Among these firms, we classify a firm as “Cross-
Listed” if shares of its common stock or its ADRs were also listed for trading on either the New 
York Stock Exchange, Nasdaq or NYSE MKT (formally the American Stock Exchange) at any 
time during the class period alleged in the class action complaint.  Among the 183 Foreign Listed 
Firms, 87 were sued in in our pre-Morrison sample period, of which 77 (88.5%) met this 
definition of Cross-Listed.  These numbers compare to 84 of the 96 (87.5%) of Foreign Listed 
Firms sued in our post-Morrison sample, which was statistically indistinguishable from the pre-
Morrison sample (χ2(1) = 0.044, ns).  The remainder of firms did not have securities listed on a 
U.S. exchange and, to the extent they were held by U.S. investors, they were presumably either 
purchased abroad, in private transactions or in the over-the-counter market95 
                                               
94 Because Morrison would not have affected foreign issuers with their sole listing in the United States, we exclude 
these issuers as discussed supra. 
95 Consistent with our central thesis, Morrison appears to have had relatively little effect even on these cases, despite 
the total absence of a U.S. exchange listing for the companies’ securities.  In particular, the case was cited as the 
basis for dismissal in only two cases, both of which were filed prior to the decision. One was an “F-squared” case 
brought against Swiss Re in 2008 and included in the class all U.S. residents who had acquired any securities of 
Swiss Re during the class period.  The district court dismissed the case in October 2010, citing Morrison and noting 
that “a security that is sold on a foreign exchange is insufficient to subject the purchase to the coverage of 
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.”  The second case was filed against Société Générale in 2008 and the plaintiff 
class included all holders of Société Générale’s securities that were purchased during the class period, including 
purchasers of its ADRs that traded solely in US in the OTC market.  In dismissing the case (including all claims by 
holders of its ADRs), the district court found that, because "[t]rade in ADRs is considered to be a 'predominantly 
foreign securities transaction,''' 10b-5 was inapplicable after Morrison. While the case has commonly been cited as 
an example of Morrison’s reach, the court’s conclusion that transactions in ADRs of foreign firms that traded in the 
OTC market were “foreign transactions” was based on a prior decision decided under the conducts and effects test 
that had dismissed a similar set of claims against Fortis, holding that OTC transactions in ADRs are “predominantly 
foreign securities transaction[s].” Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp.2d 498 (SDNY 2010). As this case suggests, even 
under the conduct and effects test, cases against foreign issuers without a U.S. exchange listing tended to fare 
poorly.  For instance, among the ten cases filed before Morrison, eight were dismissed (including the two noted 
previously), while just two settled.  Of the twelve cases filed after Morrison, five remained pending at the time of 
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We also examine for all Cross-Listed defendants the time period for which the firm had 
its securities listed on a U.S. exchange.  Issuers whose securities are listed for trading on a U.S. 
exchange can have their shares delisted for any number of reasons, including an involuntary 
delisting for failure to meet an exchange listing condition or simply because a firm chooses to 
discontinue an exchange listing.   However, under Morrison, investors who acquire shares of a 
firm following its delisting are likely to be excluded from any Rule 10b-5 class action.  Despite 
the fact that the vast majority of pre-Morrison Foreign Listed Firms had a U.S. exchange listing 
at some point during the class period, the possibility therefore exists that the securities of some 
of these defendants were not traded on a U.S. exchange for the duration of the alleged class 
period. 
 
We formally examine this issue in Figure 2 where we present for each of the Cross-Listed 
defendants (N=161), the percent of the class period during which the issuer had a U.S. exchange 
listing.  To facilitate analysis of how these percentages relate to the date of Morrison, we impose 
a dashed-vertical line at June 24, 2010, the date the case was decided.  As expected, conditional 
on a defendant having a U.S. exchange listing, cases after Morrison reflected the new standard 
and generally alleged a class period that fully coincided with the period during which the 
defendant had such a listing. Yet even before Morrison, Rule 10b-5 lawsuits almost always 
alleged a class period that coincided with the period during which the defendant had its securities 
listed on a U.S. exchange. Indeed, in only two cases was this percentage substantially less than 
100%--roughly equivalent to the post-Morrison period where three cases had percentages that 
were meaningfully less than 100%.  
                                               
our research, while four had been dismissed.  Notably, three of these post-Morrison cases had settled despite the 
absence of any U.S. exchange listing, including two involving the ADRs of Tesco PLC and Olympus Corporation, 
both of which traded in the U.S. OTC market. 
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These findings significantly undermine claims that Morrison was used “to extinguish” F-
cubed and F-squared “claims that had proliferated in the years preceding Morrison…”96  Among 
the 183 defendants in our sample that were Foreign Listed Firms, nearly 90% of the cases both 
before and after Morrison were filed against firms that maintained a U.S. exchange listing.  
Whether or not Morrison technically foreclosed investors “from accessing American courts to 
litigate claims against foreign issuers whose shares do not trade on a U.S. exchange,”97 our data 
does not indicate that investors were doing so prior to the Morrison decision.  Moreover, among 
these 161 Cross-Listed firms, almost all of the complaints alleged that the stock price was 
allegedly affected by fraudulent conduct during the time period when the firm maintained a U.S. 
exchange listing.  As a result, even where a pre-Morrison complaint included in the class those 
investors who acquired their securities in a non-U.S. venue, a plaintiff class could still be named 
that would have complied with Morrison had the decision applied to these cases.  
 
We also examine the dollar volume of U.S. exchange trading during the alleged class 
period among the 161 Cross-Listed defendants.  There are two reasons to analyze this.  First, 
prior to Morrison, critics asserted that foreign issuers were subject to suit despite having a 
limited presence in the U.S. capital markets.  Therefore, it is useful to determine whether 
Morrison had the effect of limiting U.S. litigation to foreign issuers that had a larger capital 
markets footprint in terms of dollar volume or the relative percentage of their securities that were 
traded in the U.S. markets as opposed to abroad. 
                                               
96 Conway, supra note 11, at 4. 
97 David H. Kistenbroker, Joni S. Jacobsen, & Angela M. Liu, Dechert, Developments in Global Securities 
Litigation, 4 (2017), 
https://www.dechert.com/content/dam/dechert%20files/onpoint/2017/11/White_paper_Global_Securities_Litigation
_FINAL_0218.pdf. 
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Second, despite the presence of a U.S. exchange listing, a foreign issuer will face a 
diminished risk of a Rule 10b-5 private suit if the vast majority of its trading volume occurs on 
non-U.S. venues where securities purchases will not satisfy Morrison. Thus, Morrison could 
have raised the threshold amount of U.S. trading volume before plaintiffs or their counsel would 
have found it valuable to bring a case.  Assessing the level of U.S. exchange trading among pre-
Morrison defendants thus provides a means to assess the extent to which the Morrison rule 
would have altered the risk of a 10b-5 suit for these firms, notwithstanding the fact that a pre-
Morrison defendant met the definition of a Cross-Listed firm. 
 
In Table 2 we present summary statistics of the level of U.S. exchange trading among the 
161 Cross-Listed defendants.  For each year in which a complaint was filed, the table lists the 
number of complaints filed during the year, the mean percentage of global trading (by dollar 
volume) that occurred on U.S. exchanges during the class period, and the mean dollar volume of 
U.S. exchange trading that occurred in defendant’s securities during the class period. All dollar 
figures have been inflation adjusted to reflect 2018 prices.  
 
As shown in the table, U.S. exchange trading constituted a nontrivial fraction of trading 
in these firms’ securities both before and after Morrison. Among the 77 pre-Morrison cases, the 
mean percentage of global trading occurring on U.S. Exchanges during the class period was 
38.5%, while the mean dollar volume of trading was nearly $17.5 billion.  These figures suggest 
that, even had Morrison applied to these pre-Morrison cases, damage awards for U.S. exchange 
trades could have been substantial in magnitude.  However, consistent with claims that Morrison 
might have shifted plaintiffs’ counsel to focus on firms having greater levels of U.S. exchange 
trading, the overall post-Morrison mean percentage of U.S. exchange trading and the dollar 
volume of U.S. exchange trading were higher than in the pre-Morrison period.  At the same time, 
visual inspection of the data reveals significant positive skew in U.S. trading volume during both 
periods, which cautions against relying on these overall means to make inferences regarding the 
relative level of U.S. exchange trading before and after the decision’s publication. 
  
Table 2: U.S. Exchange Trading During Class Period 
Year of Filing 
Number of 
Actions 
Median % of Global Trading (by 
dollar volume) Occurring on U.S. 
Exchanges During Class Period  
Median Dollar Volume of 
U.S. Exchange Trading 
During Class Period  
Pre-Morrison    
2002 10 34.0% $15,949,214,351  
2003 9 18.9% $5,670,880,659  
2004 13 33.0% $10,492,435,428  
2005 9 57.7% $18,370,818,888  
2006 2 46.9% $4,326,403,591  
2007 11 25.9% $34,458,485,327  
2008 13 55.7% $7,996,092,252  
2009 7 44.9% $8,822,478,039  
201098 3 28.8% $93,065,419,489  
Post-Morrison    
2011 9 45.8% $23,262,726,116  
2012 11 52.3% $27,582,826,053  
2013 11 73.6% $60,035,049,957  
2014 7 50.3% $114,094,202,060  
                                               
98 All three cases were filed prior to Morrison’s publication. 
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2015 7 41.3% $56,325,314,735  
2016 20 56.5% $51,426,601,031  
2017 19 47.3% $11,165,601,671  
Total Pre-Morrison 77 38.5% $17,465,819,136 
Total Post-Morrison 84 53.2% $42,937,810,944 
 
To more accurately assess this issue, we turn to a time series analysis that permits a more 
precise assessment of the level of U.S. exchange trading among Cross-Listed firms during our 
sample period. We present the analysis in Figure 3 which plots for each lawsuit (by date of 
filing) the natural log of the dollar volume of the firm’s shares traded on a U.S. exchange 
(plotted as hollow circles) as well as the natural log of the total dollar volume traded on the U.S. 
exchange and its primary non-U.S. venue (plotted as solid circles). Each lawsuit thus has two 
data points: a plot of its U.S. exchange dollar volume over the class period (a hollow circle) and 
a plot of its total dollar volume over the class period (a solid circle). As before, we also impose a 
vertical line that signifies the publication of Morrison. Finally, using these data, we estimate a 
local linear regression line for the level of U.S. exchange trading before and after Morrison, 
which we plot as a dashed horizontal line on either side of Morrison’s publication date. A solid 
horizontal line reflects the same estimate for a defendant’s total dollar volume of trading. To 
estimate these local linear regression lines, we use the triangle kernel and a bandwidth of 400 
days. 
  
  
 Overall, Figure 3 provides little evidence that the composition of pre-Morrison lawsuits 
would have looked substantially different had Morrison applied during this time period. As 
reflected by the gap between the two fitted regression lines, the difference between a firm’s total 
dollar volume of trading and its U.S. dollar volume of trading narrowed slightly after Morrison. 
In theory, such a development might reflect a greater emphasis after Morrison on foreign issuers 
whose equity traded primarily on a U.S. exchange, although the narrowing of this gap was also 
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evident in the months prior to Morrison. More importantly, it is the aggregate dollar volume of 
U.S. exchange trading, as opposed to the percent of U.S. exchange trading, that determines 
potential damages.  However, the overall level of U.S. exchange trading (reflected by the dashed 
horizontal lines) reveals no notable difference before and after Morrison was decided.  
 
We test formally whether the total level of U.S. exchange trading differed between pre-
Morrison defendants and post-Morrison defendants by conducting an interrupted time series 
analysis. For this analysis, our unit of observation is the mean dollar volume of U.S. exchange 
trading each calendar quarter across the 161 Cross-Listed defendants in our sample. To account 
for autocorrelation in the time series, our regression model takes the following form: 
𝑌" = 𝛽% + 𝛽'𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇" + 𝛽,𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟" + 𝛽3𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇" × 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟" + 𝜖"  (1) 
where Yt is the natural log of the mean quarterly dollar volume of U.S. exchange trading for 
quarter t, POST is an indicator variable set to 1 for each calendar quarter following June 2010, 
Quarter is a quarter trend, and POST x Quarter is an interaction term. The parameter 𝛽', our 
main parameter of interest, estimates the change in the level of U.S. exchange trading that occurs 
in the period immediately following Morrison, while 𝛽, estimates a quarterly time trend and 𝛽3 
estimates any difference in the slope of the time trend following June 2010. Standard errors were 
calculated using the Newey-West procedure with one lag based on Cumby-Huizinga tests for 
autocorrelation. 
 
Table 3 presents the results.  
  
Table 3 
 US $ Volume 
  
Post  1.03 
 (0.98) 
Quarter  0.001 
 (0.04) 
Post x Quarter 0.0003 
 (0.05) 
Constant 22.45*** 
 (0.58) 
  
N 58 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
 
Both the coefficient on Post and Post x Quarter are positive, suggesting that following 
Morrison, Cross-Listed defendants generally had a larger level of trading volume on U.S. 
exchanges than during the pre-Morrison period. These results are consistent with Table 2, which 
revealed an overall increase in the mean level of U.S. exchange trading. However, once we 
account for the positive skew in the data (through the log transformation) as well as any time 
trends, Table 3 indicates that any pre/post differences are statistically insignificant.  Overall, 
these results are consistent with the fitted regression estimates in Figure 3, which revealed no 
clear evidence that the dollar volume of U.S. exchange trading during the class period was 
greater following Morrison. Assuming the dollar volume of U.S. exchange trading among post-
Morrison defendants was necessary to incentivize a Rule 10b-5 case after Morrison, these data 
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accordingly suggest there would have been sufficient incentive to bring these pre-Morrison cases 
even had Morrison applied throughout our sample period. 
 
c. How Did Dismissals and Settlements Change Post-Morrison? 
 
Even if Morrison did not affect the type of transnational cases that had previously been 
brought under Rule 10b-5, it may have had an effect on case outcomes. For instance, cases after 
Morrison should generally exclude from the plaintiff class any investors who acquired their 
shares on a non-U.S. venue who were often included as part of a Rule 10b-5 class prior to 
Morrison. As such, it would be unsurprising if overall settlements declined as issuers faced Rule 
10b-5 actions that posed lower amounts of prospective damages.  At the same time, the evidence 
presented in Section 2(b) indicates that plaintiffs’ attorneys and investors were already targeting 
foreign issuers that had either an exclusive U.S. listing or whose U.S. exchange trading was 
otherwise significant.  To the extent foreign issuers faced a substantially similar Rule 10b-5 risk 
before and after Morrison, it is also possible that overall settlement rates would remain the same. 
Likewise, while Morrison provides a technical means to dismiss a case in which no class 
members acquired any securities on a U.S. exchange, during both the pre- and post-Morrison 
periods, nearly 90% of the cases in our sample filed against a Foreign Listed Firm involved a 
Cross-Listed defendant. This fact suggests that, whether applying the transactional test to cases 
filed before the decision or to those filed after it, outright dismissals under Morrison should be 
uncommon.  
 
To be sure, the number of observable and unobservable factors that contribute to case 
outcomes naturally raise a variety of challenges for empirically identifying the effect of 
Morrison.  However, we nevertheless present here descriptive statistics of case outcomes to 
provide an initial window into how Rule 10b-5 dismissals and settlements may have appeared to 
issuers and investors, acknowledging that our analysis does not seek to identify the precise effect 
of Morrison.  
 
We first present overall dismissal rates for defendant firms within our sample that were 
Foreign Listed Firms.  Among these 183 lawsuits, 141 had been dismissed, settled or received a 
favorable judgment by the time of our data collection.  Table 4 presents the overall distribution 
between cases that were dismissed and those that were settled or received a favorable judgment. 
Cases are also divided into whether they were filed before or after Morrison.  Overall, 
approximately 49% of the pre-Morrison cases against Foreign Listed Firms had been dismissed 
by the time we collected our sample, compared to 68% of the post-Morrison cases, a difference 
that is statistically significant at the 5% threshold (χ2(1) = 4.68, p=0.03).  It is important to note, 
however, that of the 73 lawsuits that remained pending at the time of our data collection, sixty-
five (90%) were filed after 2014. To the extent weaker cases are dismissed earlier than stronger 
cases, the post-Morrison dismissal rate may ultimately reflect a lower rate than we currently 
observe. 
 
 
  
Table 4: Settlement Rates – Firms with a Non-U.S. Listing 
 # Dismissed # Settle/Judgment 
Pre-Morrison 42 43 
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(49%) (51%) 
Post-Morrison 38 
(68%) 
18 
(32%) 
 
 
To explore whether these differential dismissal rates might be attributable to Morrison, 
we examined all motions made by the defendant firms either to dismiss the case or to limit the 
class of investors.  Case dismissals in which a court cited Morrison were unusual. Among the 
thirty-eight post-Morrison cases that were dismissed, Morrison was cited in just three cases 
(8%), compared with six of the forty-two dismissals (14%) of cases that were commenced during 
the pre-Morrison period.  The lower incidence of dismissals citing Morrison within the post-
Morrison cases is, in many respects, to be expected given that plaintiffs’ counsel would be aware 
of the case and should accordingly bring cases that would satisfy its transactional test. Likewise, 
the higher incidence of Morrison-related dismissals of cases filed before Morrison was decided 
is consistent with courts applying Morrison retroactively to cases that were presumably 
structured to satisfy the more expansive conduct and effects test. In any event, the higher 
dismissal rate among post-Morrison cases does not appear to reflect the failure of these cases to 
include at least some investors that could satisfy its transactional test.  
 
 While not appearing to affect outright dismissal rates, the Morrison decision does appear 
to have been actively deployed to dismiss class members who could not demonstrate that they 
acquired their securities on a U.S. exchange.  This was particularly true for pre-Morrison cases 
involving a global class of investors, many of whom purchased securities in the defendant firm 
on non-US venues.  Following Morrison, such cases could have been subject to a partial motion 
to dismiss that, if granted, had the effect of limiting the plaintiff class to investors who purchased 
their securities in the United States.   Among the 87 pre-Morrison cases against a Foreign Listed 
Firm, we observe 15 motions to limit the class on this basis.  All were granted by the court, citing 
Morrison.  This compares to just three such motions among the 96 cases against a Foreign Listed 
Firm in our post-Morrison sample, no doubt reflecting efforts by plaintiffs’ counsel to define an 
investor class that satisfied Morrison.  
 
Used in this fashion, Morrison could accordingly affect settlement outcomes even for 
those cases that survived a motion to dismiss. As noted previously, the Vivendi case presented a 
particularly striking example of this scenario.  The lawsuit, which had the prospect of being the 
largest securities fraud class action ever, resulted in a partial dismissal after the Morrison 
decision, limiting the class to holders of U.S. ADRs acquired on the New York Stock Exchange.  
However, less than 10% of Vivendi’s global trading volume was in the U.S. ADR market.  While 
original damages in Vivendi were estimated at $9 billion, following dismissal of investors who 
acquired Vivendi securities outside the U.S., the case settled for just $76 million in total. 
 
Yet, it is also important to note that the success of these motions after Morrison does not 
necessarily signal a more hostile environment for class action suits against foreign firms.  As 
noted previously, global class actions were relatively rare even prior to Morrison, and courts 
frequently dismissed claims based on foreign transactions even under the prior conduct and 
effects test.  For example, Hannah Buxbaum studied a ten-year sample of multinational class 
actions between 1996 and 2005 and found that less than 40% of the cases encompassed claims 
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based on foreign transactions.99  Moreover, of those cases (45), only a third were allowed to 
proceed with a class that included any claims based on non-U.S. market transactions.100  These 
findings underscore a more general observation that, compared to Morrison’s transactional test, 
the judicial discretion created by the conduct and effects test gave defense counsel broad scope 
for challenging the composition of an investor class on the basis that the court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over non-US defendants.101  For instance, among the 87 pre-Morrison cases 
against a Foreign Listed Firm, courts granted motions to limit the case in twenty-two (excluding 
the fifteen noted previously where the courts cited Morrison).  Thus, even before Morrison, the 
conduct and effects test provided defense counsel with an opportunity to limit the size of a global 
class action.  
  
 To examine more precisely the extent to which Morrison may have been associated with 
a secular decline in settlement amounts, we analyze settlement proceeds for all lawsuits within 
our sample for which we were able to obtain data.  In Figure 4, we present a scatter plot of the 
natural log of settlements paid (in $ thousands) per settled case, sorted by the date of the 
complaint.  As with Figure 3, we supplement this scatter plot with local linear regression lines to 
highlight any pre-Morrison and post-Morrison trends.102   Consistent with our prior analyses, we 
limit settlements in Figure 4 to those against Foreign Listed Firms, and all dollar figures have 
been inflation adjusted to reflect 2018 prices. 
 
                                               
99 Buxbaum, supra note 59, at 39. 
100 Id. at 40. 
101 See, e.g., In re: China Life Securities Litigation, 04 Civ 2112, Sept. 3, 2008 (SDNY) (finding subject matter 
jurisdiction under the “effects” test for U.S. residents acquiring shares of China Life stock on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange but declining to find subject matter jurisdiction under either the conduct or effects test for non-US 
purchasers). 
102 In estimating these models, we use the same regression specification utilized in Figure 2. 
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As shown in Figure 4, aggregate settlement payments varied widely across cases both 
before and after Morrison. Prior to Morrison, settlement proceeds (in 2018 dollars) ranged from 
a low of $749,000 in a 2002 suit commenced against Synsorb Biotech, Inc., to a high of $1.4 
billion in a 2003 suit against Royal Ahold Corporation.  The years after Morrison witnessed 
settlement payments that were similarly varied. Overall, settlement payments in our post-
Morrison sample ranged from a low of approximately $1 million paid by the Liberty Silver 
Corporation to a high of $3 billion paid by Petrobras Brasileiro S.A.  Overall, the median 
settlement payment in the pre-Morrison sample was $13.25 million, compared to a statistically 
indistinguishably different amount of $15.16 million in the post-Morrison sample.103  Visual 
inspection of Figure 4 likewise reveals no evident change in settlement proceeds following 
Morrison.  
 
The absence of any significant difference in overall settlement amounts for pre- and post-
Morrison cases distinguishes our findings from those of Professor Guseva who found a 
statistically significant decline in settlement proceeds following Morrison. We attribute this 
difference to the fact that our analyses have focused on Foreign Listed Firms, given that these 
firms were most directly affected by Morrison.  In contrast, the Guseva sample also includes 
firms that, while headquartered overseas, have their securities solely listed on a U.S. exchange, 
This selection choice, however, has the potential to confound a post-Morrison analysis of 
settlement proceeds for several reasons.  First, as noted previously, the years following 2005 
witnessed a steady increase in the number of 10b-5 actions against firms headquartered in China, 
with these suits constituting over 60% of 10b-5 lawsuits against foreign firms in 2010 and 2011.  
Second, these firms generally traded exclusively on U.S. exchanges, meaning that investors in 
these cases would satisfy Morrison. Consistent with this claim, none of the 94 post-Morrison 
                                               
103 A Wilcoxon rank-sum test of medians yields a test statistic of -0.368, p=0.7127. 
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cases in our sample that involved a defendant headquartered in China was subject to either a 
motion to limit the class or a motion to dismiss that was based on Morrison. Finally, trading 
volume in these firms was generally low relative to Foreign Listed Firms given that they 
generally had lower market capitalizations.  For instance, the mean U.S. dollar volume of trading 
among these firms across the sample period was approximately $12.8 million, compared to $24.7 
million for Foreign Listed Firms.  As a result, settlement amounts in these cases should be 
expected to be lower, causing their large representation within the post-Morrison sample to drive 
down mean settlement proceeds following the decision.  
 
To highlight the potential for these firms to bias the analysis of post-Morrison settlement 
proceeds, we present in Figure 5 the median settlement value by year of complaint, both for the 
full sample of defendant issuers (including all Chinese issuers) as well as for all issuers that met 
our definition of a Foreign Listed Firm. As shown in the figure, median settlement amounts for 
the full sample spike sharply in 2009104 and decline considerably for cases filed in 2010-2016.  
However, for Rule 10b-5 suits involving Foreign Listed Firms, median settlement values for 
cases filed between 2010 and 2014 generally resemble those for cases filed between 2004-2008, 
with overall median settlement amounts showing no statistically significant difference between 
the pre- and post-Morrison periods. In contrast, median settlement amounts for all firms in the 
sample decreased from $11 million for cases filed prior to Morrison to $3.2 million for those 
filed after it, with a Wilcoxon rank-sum test rejecting the hypothesis of equal medians (z=3.301, 
p<.01). Overall, these results suggest that Professor Guseva’s finding that settlement amounts 
declined following Morrison may have been driven by the inclusion in her sample of the large 
number of 10b-5 cases commenced against Chinese based issuers in the time period following 
Morrison. 
 
                                               
104 The spike in median settlement amounts in 2009 reflects the fact that 2009 cases resulted in just two settlements, 
one of which was a $150 million settlement in the Satyam Computer Services litigation. 
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d. Morrison and Attorneys’ Fees 
 
Finally, we also collect where possible data concerning the payment of fees paid to class 
counsel to identify any general patterns in the payment of fees for cases within our sample.  In 
total, we find data concerning these fee awards in 149 of our cases, of which 55 were filed 
against Foreign Listed Firms. As with our analysis of settlement data, we present here only 
descriptive statistics of fee awards to enable a better understanding of how fee payments may 
have appeared to plaintiffs’ attorneys during our sample period. 
 
 In Figure 6, we present a scatter plot of fees paid per settled case, based on the date of the 
complaint. As in Figure 3, we present dollar values (in $ thousands) in logs, sorted by the date of 
the complaint, and all dollar figures have been inflation adjusted to reflect 2018 prices. 
Consistent with our prior analyses, we limit our analysis of fees to those against Foreign Listed 
Firms. 
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 Not surprisingly, the large settlements related to the Royal Ahold NV litigation 
(commenced in 2003) and the Petroleo Brasileiro (commenced in 2014) also resulted in usually 
large fee awards of nearly $130 million and $285 million, respectively, to class counsel. As with 
Figure 3, we supplement this scatter plot with local linear regression lines to highlight any pre-
Morrison and post-Morrison trends using the same specification discussed there.105 In general, 
the data regarding fee awards generally tracks that of settlement amounts: Fee awards during our 
sample period are highly varied by case, with the local linear estimates showing no evidence of 
an increase or decrease in fees following Morrison. 
 
Following our analysis of settlement amounts, we also assess separately median fee 
awards across years, calculating medians separately for Foreign Listed Firms, as well as for all 
non-US defendants including those that trade exclusively on a U.S. venue.  Figure 7 presents the 
results.   
 
                                               
105 All dollar figures have been inflation adjusted to reflect 2018 prices. 
4
6
8
10
12
20
18
 D
ol
la
r V
al
ue
1/1/2002 1/1/2004 1/1/2006 1/1/2008 1/1/2010 1/1/2012 1/1/2014 1/1/2016 1/1/2018
Date of Complaint
Ln of Attorneys Fees (in thousands Local Linear Approximation (pre)
Local Linear Approximation (post)
Attorneys Fees Awarded Among Settled Cases
Figure 6:
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3283527 
 33 
  
 
Again, the results resemble those presented for settlement amounts in the sample. 
Aggregating all cases together, median fees generally declined in the years following Morrison.  
Specifically, among all lawsuits (including those filed against Chinese issuers), median fee 
awards in our sample of cases decreased from $2.3 million for cases filed prior to Morrison to 
$882,000 for those filed after it (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z=2.58, p<.01). This decline, however, 
was driven primarily by lower fee awards in cases filed against firms headquartered in China. 
For instance, among cases filed after Morrison, median fee awards for cases filed against firms 
headquartered in China was $570,000. Overall, focusing on Foreign Listed Firms reveals that 
median fee awards actually increased from $2.8 million for cases filed prior to Morrison to $4.4 
million for cases filed after it, although the difference was statistically insignificant (Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test: z=-0.794, ns).  As with our findings regarding settlement amounts, these results 
provide little evidence to suggest that Morrison is associated with a change in fees awarded to 
class counsel.  Our findings further underscore the need to account for the large number of 
Chinese defendant issuers in 10b-5 cases in the years following Morrison.  
 
III. Implications 
 
A. Morrison’s True Effect 
 
Our empirical analysis shows that Morrison did not dramatically change litigation from the 
pre-Morrison period.  The same types of issuers were sued both before and after Morrison with 
roughly the same frequency.  Nor did Morrison appear to change the overall results in those 
cases – although post-Morrison foreign plaintiffs were more systematically excluded from 
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plaintiff classes, settlement rates and amounts remained largely unchanged as did attorneys’ fee 
awards.106  In sum, Morrison did not transform securities fraud litigation as it existed in 2010.   
 
Similarly, Morrison was not really about changing the exposure of foreign issuers to U.S. 
litigation.107 As our data show, both before and after Morrison almost every foreign issuer that 
was sued had a U.S. exchange listing.  Accordingly, the Morrison decision does not appear to 
reduce the prospect that a foreign issuer will be sued based on its exposure to the U.S. market 
through a secondary listing. 
 
As our data show, prior to Morrison, plaintiffs were not using securities class actions to 
target issuers with no connection to the U.S. capital markets, presumably because the conduct 
and effects tests were generally effective at weeding out those cases and leading to outcomes   
similar to that as Morrison.   Indeed, Morrison was itself dismissed under the old Second Circuit 
test.  In our data set prior to Morrison there were 20 motions to limit a class under this test, 19 of 
which were granted.   
 
The conclusion that Morrison did not critically change existing practice is, however, only 
part of the story.  Morrison drastically curtailed the potential expansion of U.S. securities 
litigation by foreclosing the threatened global class action.108  In particular, Morrison prevented 
plaintiffs from using the existence of a U.S. listing to bring a class action on behalf of a 
worldwide plaintiff class, a plaintiff class that might substantially exceed the issuer’s presence in 
the U.S. capital markets.  Vivendi was the poster child for this potential expansion and, to the 
extent that cases like Vivendi were the motivation for Morrison, Morrison was a success.   
 
Putting Morrison’s true effect into context in part explains prior empirical tests of Morrison.  
Professor Robert Bartlett found that institutional investors did not initially adjust their conduct to 
Morrison, instead preferring to continue to invest abroad.109  When the non-impact of Morrison 
is highlighted, Professor Bartlett’s results jibe with the fact that Morrison appears to be largely 
consistent with past practices followed by the courts that had used the conduct and effects 
                                               
106 Our data on both filings and fee awards suggest that Morrison did not affect the incentives for plaintiffs’ 
lawyers to bring litigation against foreign issuers.  Instead, plaintiffs’ law firms continued their old practices as 
Morrison walled off a section of litigation that they had not been targeting beforehand.   In Appendix A we examine 
the composition of plaintiffs’ firms that litigated cases involving foreign issues both pre-and post-Morrison. The 
composition of law firms involved in these cases does not appear to change significantly with four firms remaining 
in the top ten in both periods.  Robbins Geller, for example, maintained a high-volume securities fraud practice 
against foreign private issuers post-Morrison with 12 cases pre-Morrison and 10 cases post-Morrison.  There are 
also a number of smaller firms in these tables, highlighting that this is a diverse practice with likely low barriers to 
entry.  We note that Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman subsequently changed its name to Milberg Weiss and 
disappeared from the top five ranking post-Morrison.  Milberg was the lead plaintiffs’ lawyers in the securities fraud 
action against Vivendi. Milberg’s practice was affected by the criminal convictions of its founders Melvyn Weiss 
and William Lerach.  See Jonathan D. Glater, Class-Action Lawyer Gets 30 Months in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 
2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/03/business/03legal.html (describing Weiss and Lerach’s convictions). 
107 See, e.g., Alex Reed, But I'm an American! A Text-Based Rationale for Dismissing F-Squared Securities Fraud 
Claims after Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 515 (2012) (analyzing the Morrison 
decision’s effect on F-Squared Cases) 
108 See, e.g., Cravath, Swaine & Moore, supra note 66 (“By clearly barring “f-cubed” lawsuits, Morrison has cut 
short a growing trend in recent years in which plaintiffs’ lawyers have attempted to use the class action mechanism 
to seek large recoveries on behalf of foreign plaintiffs with no connection to the United States.”) 
109 Bartlett, supra note 32, at 186-87. 
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tests.110  Instead, it appears that institutional investors may not have valued securities fraud 
protections both pre- and post- Morrison, instead preferring the value of lower costs and greater 
liquidity by purchasing ordinary shares on the issuers’ primary exchange.  Moreover, to the 
extent that other studies found that Morrison had a price impact, this impact would appear to be a 
consequence of a reduced possibility that these firms would be subject to Rule 10b-5 litigation in 
the future.  This mitigates towards supporting the findings of LPSL who found that US-listed 
foreign firms experienced insignificant or even positive abnormal returns in both markets, 
particularly firms having most of their equity traded outside the U.S.111   
 
This does not mean that Morrison had no effect in terms of litigation results.  Morrison 
eliminated the global class action. In the wake of Morrison there were 18 cases which had a 
portion of their classes dismissed.  This included significant judgments such as the $9 billion 
Vivendi class action and class actions involving BP Plc, Sanofi-Aventis and UBS.112  These prior 
cases had been allowed to proceed under the old Second Circuit conduct and effects tests or 
variations thereof in other Circuits or had yet to be subject to a motion to limit class brought 
under the old test. Thus, Morrison reduced the potential scope of litigation against Foreign Listed 
Firms.  Recognizing this can help us understand Morrison’s true significance.   
 
B. Toward a better Understanding of Morrison  
 
1. Morrison’s place in Balancing U.S. Securities Regulation of Foreign Issuers 
 
By requiring that plaintiffs in a suit against a Foreign Listed Firm trade their securities in the 
U.S. markets, Morrison has the effect of tying a foreign issuer’s liability exposure to the extent 
of its capital markets presence in the United States.  Under Morrison, if an issuer engages in 
securities fraud, the size of a potential plaintiff class that can bring suit under U.S. law is directly 
proportional to the number of shares that are traded in the U.S. markets.  Foreign issuers that 
raise capital in the U.S. markets or facilitate broad secondary trading of their securities will have 
greater liability exposure. 
 
This proportional exposure is consistent with the delicate balance that Congress and the SEC 
have drawn to regulate foreign issuers that participate in the U.S. capital markets while 
respecting the sovereign interests of their home regulator.  Prior to Morrison, the SEC adopted 
several regulatory boundaries that distinguished between foreign and domestic issuers.  The 
SEC’s rules were designed to attract foreign issuers to the U.S. capital markets while limiting the 
regulatory burden imposed on those issuers by U.S. law.   
 
                                               
110 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. Professor Bartlett’s results are also consistent with the argument 
by some commentators that securities fraud litigation provides limited value to diversified institutional investors 
who are equally likely to lose as to gain from a successful securities fraud suit. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the 
Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 229, 304 (2007) (arguing that securities fraud litigation 
primarily transfers wealth among diversified investors). 
111 Licht, et al., supra note 83, at 330. 
112 See generally Conway, supra note 11; Edward Greene & Arpan Patel, Consequences of Morrison v. NAB, 
securities litigation and beyond, 11(2) CAP. MARK’T J. 145 (2016). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3283527 
 36 
Starting in the 1980s, the SEC adopted a rule of substituted compliance for foreign issuers 
whose securities traded primarily outside the United States.113  These issuers, known as foreign 
private issuers, are subject to the law of their home country for the bulk of their regulation.114  
Accordingly, foreign private issuers are exempt from the obligation to file quarterly reports and 
proxy statements, need not comply with Section 16 reporting requirements,115 and do not need to 
prepare financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP.116  The rule of substituted 
compliance, in most cases, allows issuers in most cases to substitute compliance with the 
disclosure obligations imposed by their home jurisdiction rather than comply with U.S. 
disclosure requirements.  For periodic reporting the SEC explicitly adopted a rule that an issuer 
need only furnish rather than file certain reports filed with home country regulators reducing the 
scope of liability for these reports.117   
 
The result was to create a parallel regime for foreign private issuers that was significantly 
less regulated than domestic issuers.118  The justification was in part reality – foreign issuers did 
not prepare quarterly reports in many jurisdictions or have US GAAP-compliant financials –  but 
was also motivated by competitive reasons.119 The U.S. did not want to significantly overburden 
these foreign companies so that they would no longer desire to list in the United States.120  And 
the overarching justification for this was substituted compliance, the notion that it was better to 
let the home country regulator address disclosure issues for foreign issuers.121   
 
The SEC also adopted Regulation S to provide safe harbor exemptive relief for foreign firms 
that did not list their securities in the United States, enumerating the circumstances under which 
those firms would not be subject to the U.S. registration requirements when they raised capital, 
despite the global nature of the securities markets.122  The SEC went even further with Rule 
144A, which allows foreign issuers to issue securities to institutional investors in the United 
                                               
113 See generally Howell E. Jackson, Jr., Substituted Compliance: The Emergence, Substituted Compliance: The 
Emergence, Challenges, and Evolution of a New Regulatory Paradigm, 1 J. FIN. REG. 169, 171-175 (2015) (tracing 
the history of the SEC’s approach and implementation of a substituted compliance regime).  
114 See supra note 12 for a discussion of the definition of “foreign private issuer”. 
115 See 17 C.F.R. §240.3a12-3 (2018) (“Exemption from sections 14(a), 14(b), 14(c), 14(f) and 16 for securities of 
certain foreign issuers”). 
116 Securities and Exchange Commission, Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements 
Prepared In Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation To U.S. GAAP, 
Release Nos. 33-8879; 34-57026; International Series Release No. 1306; File No. S7-13-07 (Eff. March 4, 2008).  
117 See Report Of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant To Rule 13a-16 Or 15d-16 Under The Securities Exchange Act 
Of 1934, available at https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form6-k.pdf.  See also §240.13a-13 (exemption from Form 
10-Q quarterly reporting requirements); Id. §§243.100-.103 (exemption from Regulation FD). 
118 See generally Securities and Exchange Commission, Accessing the U.S. Capital Markets — A Brief Overview for 
Foreign Private Issuers, Feb. 13, 2013, available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreign-private-
issuers-overview.shtml. 
119 See generally Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. LAW REV. 89, 130-133 
(2007) (detailing the lower regulatory regime for foreign private issuers adopted by the SEC); EDWARD F. GREENE 
ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS chs. 2, 6 (7th ed. 2004) 
(delineating the regulation applicable to global issuers who raise capital in the U.S. markets). 
120 See Accessing the U.S. Capital Markets, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (“The Commission has 
adopted specific rules applicable to foreign private issuers that are designed to recognize international and home 
jurisdiction standards.”) 
121 Id.; see also Jackson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
122 For a description of Regulation S, see Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, [1989-90 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,524 (Apr. 24, 1990). 
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States without having to list them on a U.S. exchange or comply with the registration 
requirements and allows those institutions to resell the securities freely to other institutional 
investors.123 Rule 144A is understood as creating a sophisticated institutional market for players 
that can fend for themselves both with respect to the disclosure they seek from an issuer and the 
extent to which they seek additional regulatory protection.   
 
These regulations incorporate several key regulatory principles.  First, U.S. regulation should 
not interfere with the policies of a foreign issuer’s primary regulator.  Second, the manner and 
scope of U.S. regulation should be based on the extent to which the foreign issuer participates in 
the U.S. capital markets.  Third, the need for regulatory protection is greater with respect to 
investors that are not able to fend for themselves. 
 
Morrison takes an analogous approach.  When issuers use the U.S. capital markets by selling 
or allowing their securities to be traded in the United States, Morrison dictates that investors 
have the benefit of U.S. law, similar to the SEC’s rules regarding foreign private issuers.  At the 
same time, Morrison provides a light touch – extending that protection only to U.S. transactions.  
The scope of liability post-Morrison also has the virtue of aligning with investment patterns.  
Retail investors, those who need the most protection, do not extensively invest abroad.  
Meanwhile, institutional investors have the sophistication that enables them to make a choice 
between continuing their practice of investing abroad in cases in which they do not require the 
direct protection of Rule 10b-5 or incurring the higher cost of trading on a U.S. exchange. 
 
To a degree, the rule adopted in Morrison is even more nuanced than the general system of 
substituted compliance since a Foreign Listed Firm’s liability exposure is directly proportional to 
its use of the U.S. capital markets.  Post-Morrison, a number of lower court cases have 
considered the issuer’s purposeful availment of the U.S. markets as a key factor in determining 
whether the case could be maintained.  For example, in In re Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Mktg., 
Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.,124 the court concluded that Volkswagen’s level one 
ADRs, which were not listed on an exchange but traded in the over-the-counter market, 
nonetheless met the definition of domestic securities transactions under Morrison.  In so doing, 
the court emphasized the fact that “Volkswagen took affirmative steps to make its securities 
available to investors  here in the United States.”125  The court in Vancouver Alumni Asset 
Holdings Inc. v. Daimler AG,126 similarly found that Daimler “sought to avail itself of the 
American securities market [where it] actively and voluntarily contracted with an American 
depository bank to sell ADRs to American investors.”127 
 
The theory that an issuer’s exposure to private liability should be proportionate to the market 
impact of its conduct is not limited to foreign issuers.  Rather the concept has its roots in the 
express liability provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 – sections 11 and 12.  Both provisions 
distinguish between the impact of fraudulent misrepresentations on the direct participants in an 
                                               
123 17 C.F.R. §230.144A (1991); see also Resale of Restricted Securities, Changes to Method of Determining 
Holding Period of Restricted Securities under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 33-6862 [1989-90 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,523, at 80, 641-42 (Apr. 23, 1990). 
124 In re Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.  (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
125 Id. at *813.  
126 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83621 (C.D. Cal. 2017). 
127 Id. at *21. 
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offering from the effect of those statements on the market as a whole. In both cases, only direct 
participants have standing to bring a private claim.  Section 11 imposes this limitation through 
the tracing requirement, which courts have interpreted to require a plaintiff to demonstrate that 
the securities he or she purchased can be traced directly to the fraudulent offering.128  Section 12 
does so by requiring privity – an investor can only recover from his or her direct seller and those 
who actively solicited the investment.129 In addition, the 1933 Act expressly limits the exposure 
of underwriting participants by capping damages at the offering price130  As the courts have 
recognized, Congress’ purpose in establishing these limits was to maintain proportionality 
between a defendants’ potential liability and its role in the offering.131  
 
Maintaining a proportionality between liability exposure and market impact allows offering 
participants to evaluate the potential consequences of their behavior, to engage in an informed 
cost-benefit analysis about the level of care that they devote to ensuring the integrity of their 
disclosures and to price their liability risk accurately.  These same considerations are applicable 
to a foreign issuer’s decision to cross-list its securities.  Thus, Morrison enables an issuer to 
weigh the value from listing in the U.S. markets in terms of access to capital, increased liquidity 
and potential quality signaling, against the cost of liability exposure and, importantly, to avoid 
extensive liability exposure based on a minimal market presence.   
 
This understanding of Morrison bears on an issue that has received inconsistent treatment 
from the courts in both the pre- and post-Morrison periods, the ability of purchasers of a foreign 
firms ADRs that trade only in the U.S. OTC market to bring antifraud claims.  In contrast to 
cases such as Volkswagen and Daimler, cases such as Fortis (a pre-Morrison case) and Société 
Générale (a post-Morrison case) dismissed claims made by holders of these ADRs on the basis 
that they were “predominantly foreign.” The proportionality interpretation of Morrison that we 
advance here suggests that such a cavalier assessment of whether Rule 10b-5 applies to these 
investors misses the key question courts should be asking. In particular, the issue in these cases is 
not whether an ADR transaction is predominantly foreign or domestic, but whether the existence 
of trading in the U.S. OTC market reflects the efforts of the issuer to obtain access to the U.S. 
capital markets.132  To the extent that an issuer has purposefully availed itself of the U.S. capital 
markets by sponsoring or assisting in the sale of U.S. ADRs, that issuer should face antifraud 
liability to investors who purchase those ADRs within the United States. 
 
                                               
128 See, e.g., In re Century Aluminum Co. Sec. Litig., 729 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that the tracing 
requirement is the condition Congress has imposed for granting access to the "relaxed liability requirement [section] 
11 affords"); Krim v. PCOrder.com, 402 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Aftermarket purchasers seeking standing 
must demonstrate the ability to "trace' their shares to the faulty registration."); 
129 See Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 
WASH. L. REV. 429, 440 (2000) (“The privity requirement limits access to section 12(a)(2)'s remedy and has allowed 
some courts to find that privity alone limits access to the remedy”).  Some commentators have argued that courts 
have eroded the privity requirement. See, e.g., Bryan M. Schneider, Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933: The 
Privity Requirement in The Contemporary Securities Law Perspective, 51 TENN. L. REV. 235 (1984) (arguing the 
courts have expanded the scope of 12(a)(2) liability beyond what the statute should cover). 
130 See § 11(g) ("In no case shall the amount recoverable under this section exceed the price at which the security 
was offered to the public,") 
131 See, e.g., Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967) (observing also that a shareholder’s recovery could be 
diluted if the scope of potential plaintiffs were expanded). 
132 As discussed in note 28, ADRs can be sponsored or unsponsored by the issuer. 
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2. Morrison and the Extraterritorial Application of Federal Statutes 
 
In a series of cases after Morison addressing jurisdictional issues, the Supreme Court has 
drawn bright, foreclosing lines to prevent U.S. exercise of jurisdiction abroad.  These cases were 
put forth as an issue of comity and sovereignty as well as judicial resources.  But they all were 
decided on a more doctrinal point: The U.S. as a matter of international norms and laws should 
not be exercising jurisdiction over foreign matters without express Congressional intent.   
 
The Morrison decision rests at the core of these cases.  Subsequent courts have cited 
Morrison as the “leading case on extraterritoriality.”133  As the Supreme Court later explained, its 
holding in Morrison, combined with its decision in RJR Nabisco v. European Community,134 
produced “a two-step framework for deciding questions of extraterritoriality.”135  Step one asks 
“whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted.”136  Quoting Morrison, 
the Court explained that it can be rebutted “only if the text provides a ‘clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application.’”137  Step two asks “’whether the case involves a domestic 
application of the statute.’”138 The Court explained the resulting framework as consistent with 
“the commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”139 
 
This rationale led the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, to conclude that the 
Alien Tort Claim Act does not apply extraterritorially.140 Quoting Morrison, the Court explained 
“[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”141  
Similarly, although the Court in Daimler AG v. Bauman et al. rejected the plaintiff’s claims 
largely on jurisdictional grounds, concluding that Daimler’s contacts with California were 
insufficient to subject it to general personal jurisdiction, the Court also observed “Recent 
decisions of this Court, however, have rendered plaintiffs’ ATS and TVPA claims infirm.”142  
 
Lower courts have taken the Supreme Court at its word and, similarly, have applied Morrison 
to endorse a restrictive test for determining whether legislation should be applied 
extraterritorially.  For example, in Microsoft Corp. v. United States, the Second Circuit followed 
the approach in Morrison to conclude that the Stored Communications Act does not apply 
extraterritorially and, as a result, did not authorize U.S. courts to issue and enforce warrants for 
the seizure of electronic information that is stored exclusively on foreign servers.143 In Cedeño, 
the court extended Morrison’s reasoning to the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
                                               
133 United States v. Hussain, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178675, *4-6 (N.D.Cal.). 
134 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
135 WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2136 (2018). 
136 Id. at 2136, citing RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 195 L. Ed. 2d 
476, 493 (2016). 
137 Id. citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 177 L. Ed. 2d 535 
(2010). 
138 Id. citing RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at ___, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 195 L. Ed. 2d 476, 493. 
139 Id. citing Smith v. United States, 507 U. S. 197, 204, n. 5, 113 S. Ct. 1178, 122 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1993) 
140 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. 108, 124 (2012). 
141 Id. at 115. 
142 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 141 (2014). 
143 Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated by United States v. Microsoft Corp., 2018 
U.S. LEXIS 2495 (U.S., Apr. 17, 2018). 
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Organizations Act.  Judge Rakoff explained that “[a]lthough Morrison does not address the 
RICO statute, its reasoning is dispositive here.”144  Similarly, the court in Loginovskaya v. 
Batratchenko concluded that Morrison’s transaction test applied to antifraud claims under the 
Commodities Exchange Act145 and that “prior CEA case law addressing extraterritoriality has 
seemingly been abrogated by Morrison.”146  And in Spizz v. Goldfarb Seligman & Co. the Court 
held that the avoidance provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code do not apply extraterritorially 
and therefore could not be used to avoid an allegedly fraudulent transfer that occurred in 
Israel.147 
 
As these cases illustrate, Morrison has been broadly read to endorse a restrictive test for 
determining whether legislation should be applied extraterritorially.  The problem with this 
reading is that Morrison is not properly understood as a case about extraterritoriality, despite the 
Court’s characterization of its holding.   Although the Court in Morrison purported to speak 
about the “the extraterritorial application of § 10(b),” 148  our results demonstrate that the 
Morrison rule has the effect of applying § 10(b) to fraudulent conduct both within and outside 
the United States so long as the plaintiff purchased his or her shares in the U.S. markets.    
 
Morrison put in context thus is not, in fact, a case about the scope of foreign conduct that can 
give rise to liability under U.S. law; rather it is properly understood as a standing case.  Our 
results show that the effect of the Morrison rule is to allow the U.S. antifraud provision to reach 
fraudulent conduct that takes place outside the United States. Morrison, however, limits those 
who can assert a violation to investors who have traded in the U.S. markets.  Morrison is 
therefore a foreclosing case, but a case about foreclosing the scope of permissible plaintiffs, not 
the scope of potential defendants.149 Whatever the Court’s views about the appropriate scope of 
                                               
144 Cedeño v. Intech Group, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). See also Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. 
Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that Morrison's presumption of extraterritoriality 
applies to the RICO statute). 
145 Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 936 F. Supp. 2d 357, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
146 Id. at 368. 
147 562 B.R. 601, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. January 9, 2017) 
148 Morrison at 254. 
149 This aspect of Morrison may be criticized to the extent that it reduces the scope of legal protection available to 
U.S. investors by limiting their ability to recover damages when they are defrauded in connection with securities 
trades that do not take place on a U.S. exchange.  As Professor Bartlett noted, after Morrison the institutional 
investor community warned that, “to maintain global diversification while retaining the same antifraud protection 
existing before Morrison, institutional investors may seek to move their international holdings from shares 
purchased and sold on foreign exchanges to ADRs traded on domestic exchanges.”  Bartlett, supra note 32, at 185 
citing Christian J. Ward & J. Campbell Barker, Morrison v. National Australia Bank: The Impact on Institutional 
Investors, Council of Institutional Investors, at 12 (2012), available at 
http://www.cii.org/files/publications/governance_ basics/Report_Morrison_v_National_Australia_Bank.pdf.  Id. at 
186-87.  We note, however, that commentators have questioned the extent to which private securities fraud litigation 
effectively compensates injured investors.  See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: 
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 19n-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 
1312-1313 (2008) (“Rule 10b-5 class actions fail to provide meaningful compensation to the class members on 
whose behalf they are brought”).To the extent that the primary objective of private securities fraud litigation is 
deterrence rather than compensation, eliminating the ability of some investors to sue does not necessary undermine 
that goal.  See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 
WISC. L. REV. 297; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The "Innocent Shareholder": An Essay on Compensation and Deterrence 
in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 243.   
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federal legislation, the Morrison test is inconsistent with a narrow application of that legislation 
to domestic conduct.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Morrison has been hailed as substantially changing the risk of suit for foreign issuers. This at 
least is the legend of Morrison. Our empirical analysis however, changes this assessment.  We 
find that Morrison did not change litigation rates, settlements, or attorney’s fees.  Moreover, our 
empirical analysis shows that lawyers targeted the same type of foreign issuers both pre-and 
post-Morrison in terms of volume.  
 
Instead Morrison is best viewed as a preemptive rule – addressing and foreclosing the 
possible rise of global class actions for U.S.-listed foreign issuers exemplified by Vivendi and 
providing clarity that the liability exposure for foreign issuers would be proportional to their 
presence in the U.S. capital markets.  At the same time, Morrison preserved the protection of the 
U.S. securities laws for investors who purchase the securities of foreign investors in the U.S. 
markets, even for fraudulent conduct that arguably occurs abroad.  
 
Ultimately, when put in its proper context based on the data, Morrison’s holding was 
consistent with longstanding SEC practices to subject foreign issuers to jurisdiction for their U.S. 
actions but at the same time to leave substantial parts of the regulation of these issuers to their 
home jurisdiction.  Morrison was also consistent with the overall structure of the federal 
securities laws which limit the liability exposure of market participants based on the impact of 
their conduct. Put in this context Morrison is not a foreclosing case, but a case about defining 
permissible plaintiffs. It was not about the location of defendants. It was a case about standing 
and not extraterritoriality.  
 
In other words, Morrison was not so much a game-changer but a simple application of 
longstanding principles with limited consequences.  As a result, our findings that its effect was 
modest should not be surprising.  
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Appendix A: LEGAL COUNSEL RANKINGS 
     
 Pre-Morrison Rankings   Attorneys' Fees   Settlements  
# 
Cases 
1 Entwistle & Cappucci, LLP $130,648 $1,100,000 1 
2 Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP $62,466 $323,300 13 
3 Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann, LLP $42,488 $239,350 4 
4 Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, PLLC $38,363 $185,300 7 
5 Bernstein, Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP $49,780 $179,608 6 
6 Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP $25,170 $108,675 9 
7 Spector, Roseman & Kodroff, PC $20,070 $95,100 2 
8 Law Offices of Jan Meyer & Associates, PC $30,000 $89,508 1 
9 Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd LLP $15,221 $81,605 12 
10 Pomerantz Grossman Hufford Dahlstrom & Gross, LLP $9,000 $75,000 1 
     
     
     
 Post-Morrison Rankings   Attorneys' Fees   Settlements  
# 
Cases 
1 Labaton Sucharow LLP $66,012 $345,500 5 
2 Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP $52,710 $258,200 6 
3 Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann, LLP $35,473 $229,950 5 
4 Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd LLP $51,079 $207,600 10 
5 Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A. $27,450 $157,450 2 
6 Bleichmar Fonti Tountas & Auld, LLP $25,137 $120,000 1 
7 Saxena White, P.A. $29,625 $94,000 4 
8 Scott & Scott, LLP $22,065 $80,235 2 
9 Bernstein, Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP $15,025 $53,500 2 
10 Pomerantz Grossman Hufford Dahlstrom & Gross, LLP $3,500 $37,500 2 
     
 
 The composition of law firms both pre- and post-Morrison does not appear to change 
significantly.  Prior to Morrison, five law firms are top law firms as defined by Professors 
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Krishnan, Solomon and Thomas.150  Post Morrison, there are also five law firms in this defined 
ranking.  Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman subsequently changed its name to Milberg Weiss 
and disappeared from the top five ranking post-Morrison.  Notably Milberg was the lead 
plaintiffs’ lawyers in the securities fraud action against the foreign private issuer Vivendi.  This 
case resulted in a judgement with potential liability of $9 billion which was mostly eliminated as 
a result of Morrison.  This case is not included in this table as it is one of the few securities fraud 
litigations to ever result in a judgement after trial.  Robbins Geller maintained a high volume 
securities fraud practice against foreign private issuers post-Morrison with 12 cases pre-
Morrison and 10 cases post-Morrison.  There are also a number of smaller firms in these tables, 
highlighting that this is a diverse practice with likely low barriers to entry.  
 
 
                                               
150 CNV Krishanan, Randall Thomas & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Who are the Top Law Firms? Assessing the 
Value of Plaintiffs’ Law Firms in Merger Litigation, 18(1) AM. LAW AND ECON. REV. 122 (2016). 
